Friday Night Playoff Preview

The fourth quarter in Charlotte on Friday night wasn't a portent of playoff doom, but I suspect we'll see something similar again in April. Not the spectacle* of Dwight Howard getting ejected, but the mostly empty offensive possessions the Hawks managed from 5:54 to 1:17 of fourth quarter.

*Howard wasn't playing especially well before the ejection, his frustration with Cody Zeller causing him to call for the ball in the post which, at best, wasted several seconds of half-court possessions. The Hornets could afford to over-defend Howard, fronting him in the post and sagging toward him from weakside because the only Hawk you absolutely can't help off of (someone tell the Bucks this) is Kyle Korver.

Mike Muscala missing everything on a wide-open corner 3, Kent Bazemore and Dennis Schröder losing the ball in the lane after working to beat the initial defender aren't examples of a flawed process, something that can (or needs to) be fixed. They're examples of useful players butting up against the limits of their abilities. Sometimes they will convert those opportunities but more often they simply won't be able.

Swarm Millsap, don't help off of Korver, and force the other Hawks on the floor to make plays will be the default defensive strategy against this team on every possession that matters. Dwight Howard's freedom to go after offensive rebounds offers something the Hawks have not previously had on the back-end of initial possessions that end in a missed shot, but he doesn't add much on the front-end* of them.

*The Schröder/Howard pick-and-roll may develop enough to change my mind, but right now, teams can throw one to one-and-a-half help defenders toward it safe in the knowledge that Schröder largely operates on a binary - shoot or throw a lob to Howard - decision tree.

Running out Malcolm Delaney, Tim Hardaway, Jr., Thabo Sefolosha, Mike Muscala, and either Paul Millsap or Dwight Howard to grind down opposing second units is a good thing, and a viable path to 50 regular season wins. An effective second unit will be less valuable in the playoffs, where the margins are narrower*, and the team's inability to put multiple multi-dimensional offensive players on the court simultaneously will strangle a fair number of crucial offensive possessions.

*Unless you draw a clearly inferior version of yourself, as the Hawks did in the first round last season.

Hickory-High: Offensive Geometry

Ian Levy looks at how NBA offenses distribute possessions, the results won't surprise regular Hawks watchers but the accompanying radar graph is a nice way of looking at the problem:

In these graphs we also see examples of teams struggling to find success both because of an inefficient balance, and an inability to exploit specific opportunities. The Hawks had some terrific offensive options at their disposal this season. They had strong spot up shooting from Kirk Hinrich, Willie Green, Joe Johnson, Jeff Teague and Marvin Williams. They also had two strong ball handlers in the pick-and-roll in Johnson and Teague. The performance of Teague was particularly impressive, averaging 0.93 points per possession in the pick-and-roll, well above the league average. Unfortunately 29.7% of their possessions in our data set went to Josh Smith in either isolations, spot-ups or post ups. Smith was an atrocious spot up shooter, scoring just 0.81 points per possession, well below the league average of 0.94. He was right around average on post ups and isolations, but again, nearly a third of the Hawks’ offensive possessions were being used on some of their least efficient outcomes.

The two most efficient outcomes for the Hawks during the 2011-12 season were Josh Smith cutting and Joe Johnson spotting up. The four least efficient outcomes were Josh Smith in isolation, Joe Johnson as pick-and-roll ballhandler, Jeff Teague in isolation and Josh Smith spotting up.

ESPN.com: Hollinger: Horford's return could swing series

John Hollinger on how Al Horford's return improved the Hawks' spacing and ball-movement:

Horford's return was palpable at both ends, but especially offensively. Atlanta had been killing a power play on offense with Boston ignoring the Hawks' centers, but Horford made them pay. Joe Johnson said Boston's strategy of crowding him didn't change, but the result did; Horford was constantly open and he either scored on his own, found the open man (three assists), or facilitated a pass to open up a previously clogged offense.

The telltale sign: Open corner 3-pointers. They'd been as rare as chowder in these parts, but Atlanta got several Tuesday night and converted 7-of-16 from distance. Marvin Williams, instated as a starter to guard Boston's Paul Pierce, made three of them, tripling his total from the first four games.

The Hawks have won two games in this series. In those games, they've made 17-45 (37.8%) of their 16-23' two-point jumpers and 14-36 (38.9%) of their three-point attempts. In their three losses, the Hawks have made 13-50 (26%) of their 16-23' two-point jumpers and 14-64 (21.9%) of their three-point attempts.

This team has to make jump shots to win, even against a similarly limited offensive team. Al Horford's ability to make open shots and create open shots for his teammates with his passing increases the Hawks' chances of making jump shots, even against an excellent defensive team.

Wherein Joe Johnson and I Are Largely in Agreement

Chris Vivlamore reports on Joe Johnson's assessment of Game 4:

A day later, Joe Johnson was at loss for words about the Hawks’ embarrassing Game 4 loss to the Celtics that has the team on the brink of playoff elimination.

His one-word answer to a question on his number of shot attempts spoke volumes.

Johnson took just eight shots in Sunday’s 101-79 loss to the Celtics, who are up 3-1 in the best-of-seven series heading into Game 5 Tuesday at Philips Arena.

“I don’t think they are doing anything different defensively on me,” Johnson said. “I think it’s just, basically, getting an opportunity to touch the ball. That’s it.”

When asked if he was not happy with his touches, Johnson answered with a simple, but emphatic, “No.”

I didn't think the Celtics did anything different defensively on Joe Johnson, either. Nor am I happy with his touches.

Joe Johnson's touches, a word picture by Bret LaGree

Remain stationary
Receive the ball
(beat)
Dribble laterally to or away from the basket
(second Boston defender arrives)
Take contested jump shot or pass to teammate Boston purposely leaves open

I mean, come on. Based on his playoff performances as a Hawk, Joe Johnson would be expected to score 14 whole points in 31 minutes of action, not a mere 9.

Joe Johnson wants touches so badly he's resorting to getting his fix on the defensive end, touching, lingering even, on almost every screen a Celtic sets to free Paul Pierce.

Only 4 years and $89 million to go.

Hickory-High: Atlanta Hawks: Go Small. Go Far.

At Hickory-High, Matt Cianfrone looks at 5-man units and wonders if playing Marvin Williams at the four alongside Jeff Teague, Kirk Hinrich, Joe Johnson, and Josh Smith might help with that pesky problem the Hawks have scoring against teams with winning records, a problem they will be forced to overcome in the playoffs:

The inability to score has been particularly striking against the teams in the playoffs at the moment: New York, Orlando, Oklahoma City, Indiana, Miami, the Los Angeles Clippers and Lakers, Boston, Chicago, Memphis, San Antonio and Philadelphia. In the 19 games the Hawks have played against those opponents since Horford’s injury the they have scored over ninety points 4 times; twice against Indiana, once against the Thunder, and once against the Knicks. In only two games did the Hawks score 100 points or more, one of two matchups with the Pacers, and one of two with the Knicks . Meanwhile in seven of those games the Hawks have scored less than 80 points, and in one game against the Magic, the Hawks needed overtime to score 89 points.

Cianfrone uses this as a jumping off point to examine how the offense functions:

Plenty of this offensive problem is centered on how the Hawks offense is built. Atlanta runs isolation plays on 12.0% of their possessions according to mySynergySports.com, a number that is comparable to other isolation heavy teams such as the Thunder (13.7%) and Lakers (12.8%). Unfortunately for the Hawks they do not have a Kobe Bryant, Russell Westbrook, or Kevin Durant on their roster. What they do have is Joe Johnson; who is pretty good in isolation situations scoring 0.85 points per possession, only 0.02 points less than Bryant. The biggest problem for the Hawks is where the ball goes when a Johnson isolation does not work. So far this year that answer has been to Josh Smith. This season Smith has 161 isolation possessions more than anyone on the Hawks outside of Johnson’s 212. In fact the two, combined, account for about 53% of the Hawks 703 team isolation possessions. Smith though does not use his portion to produce anything near that of Johnson, scoring 0.75 points per possession in these situations, shooting only 35.3% from the field, and turning the ball over 6.2% of the time. In total, Smith only scores on 39.1 percent of his isolation attempts. There has to be a better option for a struggling offense.

There are four good paragraphs (too good to pick just one to excerpt) about the pick-and-roll offense and a consideration of the defensive consequences of a small lineup. There is no consideration of Marvin Williams' playoff history which, admittedly, might render the whole value of getting him more minutes at the expense of the rest of the bench moot.

TrueHoop: Closers Aren't Everything

Head man Henry Abbott passes along a nugget from a yet-to-be-released feature from NBA.com. Guess which team is leading the league in effective field goal percentage when trailing by three points or less or tied in the final three minutes of games this season.

Shot Location and Success

Here's the stuff I mentioned earlier in the week. Shot volume and field goal percentage by location, broken down by quality of opponent. First, the percentage of field goal attempts from each of the five locations provided by Hoopdata:

Opponent	at rim	3-9 feet	10-15 feet	16-23 feet	3PTA
under .500	28.8%	11.8%	5.8%	29.7%	23.9%
over .500	30.2%	12.1%	5.6%	30.6%	21.4%

The main item of note is that the Hawks take far fewer three-point shots against teams above .500. Since the Hawks are 4th in the league in three-point shooting but just 13th in offensive efficiency, not getting those shots up is a big deal. Not for the first time, Michael Cunningham is onto something.

Fewer three-point attempts doesn't entirely explain* the Hawks scoring 15.6 fewer points per 100 possessions against opponents with winning records. The slight upticks in shot attempts from the two lowest percentage areas (3-9 and 16-23 feet) are exaggerated by how rarely the Hawks have been making those low-percentage shots. Here's the teams eFG% from each location:

Opponent	at rim	3-9 feet	10-15 feet	16-23 feet	3PTA
under .500	60.9%	45.1%	40.8%	39%	60.6%
over .500	59.8%	32.7%	47.1%	32.6%	55.6%

The inability to make the high-percentage shots (at the rim and beyond the arc) is also an obvious hindrance to scoring efficiently against better opponents. Don't let that 47% shooting from 10-15 feet against opponents over .500 get you too excited. That's a sample of just 68 shots over 15 games.

*Nor does their shooting numbers. As shown previously, the Hawks rebound far fewer of their misses against better opponents.

Josh Smith: Field Goal Percentage By Location

From Hoopdata, through last night's game:

Location	FGA/G	eFG%
At the rim	4.8	69.6
Everywhere else	8.7	33.7

Not much of a surprise, nor much to add. Anyone paying attention knows that Josh Smith quite obviously excels at some things, quite obviously struggles with others, and his strengths and weaknesses don't always inform his actions.

The league averages 63% at the rim and 41.3% from everywhere else.

Quote of the Day -- January 21, 2012

Larry Drew:

"It got tough for us in the third quarter and we quit. That’s what happened."

Strong words following a game where your team allowed just a point per possession on the road against a team that ranks in the top five in the league in offensive efficiency. The Hawks shot the ball poorly and rebounded worse (or vice-versa, I wouldn't argue the particulars) but those are both single-game risks inherent with this roster, built around jump shooters and reflecting a long-held, institutional belief that rebounding is not a skill.

With Al Horford out, Marvin Williams is clearly the team's third-best rebounder. Either Tracy McGrady or Vladimir Radmanovic is the fourth-best rebounder. And the team is again near the top of the league in long, two-point jump shots attempted per game. That's not accounting for pace.

If you're going to have fewer than 90 offensive possessions a game and you're going to use 26 of those possessions on long, two-point jump shots, then you're going to have nights where you struggle to score and put tremendous pressure on your performance in the other three factors.

BB-Ref.com: Who Ruled the Top Defenses in 2011?

Neil Paine looked at how players performed last season against good and bad defensive teams. Joe Johnson and Josh Smith had the seventh- and fifth-greatest decrease in effectiveness against good defenses compared to bad defenses, respectively. Whether that's because the Hawks were 20th in the league in offense or why the Hawks were 20th in the league in offense is a fair question, and one I hope to see answered in a 2011-12 season. Regardless of causation, I expect the correct answer involves lots of missed jump shots. Joe Johnson simply not making less than 30% of his three-point attempts and Josh Smith simply not shooting (say it with me) 482 shots outside of 16 feet could make a very positive difference whether the change is scheme or player motivated.

A Happy Thought In Sad Anticipation of the Lockout

I'd have been much more invested in the minicamp the Hawks held had the coming lockout not felt impending and inevitable.

Here's hoping this desire of Larry Drew's comes to pass whenever business resumes:

"We need knock-down shooters. Not the guys that are capable of making shots. We need guys that they are open, they get that ball, the opposition is saying, ‘Uh-oh.’ Those type guys."

The strong side of Atlanta's half-court will usually struggle against better defenses if the weak side of Atlanta's half-court offense consists of Marvin Williams and Josh Smith* spotting up, waiting to get the ball and take a shot the defense is all too glad for them to take.

*Even Al Horford, good though he was at knocking down mid-range-to-long two-pointers, wasn't, in and of himself, improving Atlanta's offense that much, compared to the league, by consistently knocking the least efficient shot in basketball.

Acquiring some personnel better suited to spreading the floor and Joe Johnson making a reasonable percentage of his three-point attempts probably gets the Hawks back to an above average offense even if nothing else changes for the better. Let the "knock-down shooters" be this off-season's "bulky" center.

Unsuccessful Isolation Offense a Key Difference for the Atlanta Hawks in Game 2

I harped a lot on rebounding in my recap of Game 2 because a) I figured most people wouldn't, b) I genuinely thought it important, and c) my less-formulaic Prof. Berri shtick is the best I've got some days.

On the other hand, of course terrible shooting, be it Josh Smith and Marvin Williams spotting up on the weakside, Jamal Crawford taking bad, quick shots, or isos -Joe or -Al, had a significant impact on the outcome. Courtesy ESPN Stats and Info:

In Game 1, the Hawks had 22 isolation plays out of 86 plays in the halfcourt (25.6%). Atlanta shot 52.9% in those situations (9-17).

In Game 2, the Hawks had 20 isolation plays out of 84 plays in the halfcourt (23.8%). Atlanta shot 35.7% in those situations (5-14).

Without doing a full accounting of the differences between Games 1 and 2, I think it's fair to say that roughly one-half of the 21-point swing was down to less success when the Hawks went iso.

Some Shotmaking Particulars

(HT: Jason Walker's must-read response to the Mike Prada piece linked below.)

The Atlanta Hawks take a lot of long two-point jump shots. The Atlanta Hawks typically make those shots at a better rate than other teams. This didn't create a good offense for the Hawks in the regular season because those aren't very efficient shots. On the other hand, making those inefficient shots at a slightly worse rate in the playoffs isn't necessarily going to cripple an offense* because of that very same built-in inefficiency. Especially when said offense counters its decreased efficiency on an inefficient shot with a greatly increased efficiency on a really efficient shot.

*And acknowledging that, outside of the two Game 1s, the Atlanta offense hasn't been very efficient in the playoffs, either.

Quite simply: the Atlanta Hawks didn't make a high percentage of three-point shots during the regular season but they're making a very high percentage of three-point shots through seven playoff games. As a team, the Hawks are shooting 38.6% in the playoffs (up from 35.2% during the regular season). The Hawks are shooting 38.6% in the playoffs despite Josh Smith making just 3 of 16 three-pointers and Al Horford, Jeff Teague, and Damien Wilkins combining to miss all five of their attempts from beyond the arc.

The Atlanta guards, though, have been dynamite from beyond the arc. Joe Johnson, Jamal Crawford, and Kirk Hinrich have collectively made 38 three-pointers at a 46.8% rate. Hinrich shot the three well in his brief time in Atlanta, but the Hawks' offense suffered all season from poor three-point shooting from Johnson (29.7% on 300 attempts) and Crawford (34.1% on 349 attempts) and it's their hot shooting from beyond the arc (a combined 30 of 64 through seven playoff games), more than anything happening in the team's trademark 16-23' sliver of shot selection, that has made the Hawks a profoundly tougher out than their regular season results suggested.

Is There a Silver Lining to the Game 5 Loss?

Short answer: no.

Longer answer: almost entirely not.

There was one positive thing on display last night, and one needn't even look selectively or qualify it:

• Al Horford and Josh Smith combined for 25 rebounds in less than 70 minutes of combined playing time.

It's difficult to imagine a circumstance wherein that achievement would necessitate a caveat. However, everything else the boxscore describes is either an accurate description of ineptitude or fool's gold.

Al Horford earned an assist on 6 of the 16 field goals his teammates made while he was on the court. Of those six assists, one resulted in a Zaza Pachulia layup to pull the Hawks within 20 points with 1:47 left in the first half. One resulted in a long two-pointer from Kirk Hinrich. One resulted in a Jamal Crawford three-pointer. The other three resulted in two long Josh Smith two-point jumpers and a Josh Smith three-pointer. Al's a good passer but iso-Al, at best, created slightly better than average jump shot opportunities for his teammates. Which brings us to the other two misleading items from the boxscore: Josh Smith's 22 points and Atlanta's 32 free throw attempts.

Josh Smith played 9:24 in the first quarter. He scored five points on six field goal and six free throw attempts. After taking (and missing) a 22-footer late in the shot clock on Atlanta's first offensive possession of the game, Smith took his next five shots inside of ten feet. He made one of those shots. A couple were good attempts that missed. A couple were taken right handed, and in desperation, after he failed to get to the basket going left. When Smith returned in the second quarter, the Hawks were down 19. Over the second and third quarters, Smith scored 17 points on 12 field goal and six more free throw attempts. His first two shots upon re-entering the game and 7 of those 12 field goal attempts would be taken at least 18 feet from the basket. Smith scored his points in a manner perfectly acceptable to the opposition, a manner that in no way could change the course of the game.

Similarly, the Hawks attempted an uncharacteristically large number of free throws but not so many of them before the game was decided. In the second quarter, the Atlanta Hawks attempted 19 field goals and not a single free throw. Of Atlanta's 22 second-half free throw attempts, 12 came in the final 12:48 of the game. Yes, poor defense and good Orlando shooting rendered the other 10 second-half free throw attempts pretty meaningless as well but, let me repeat, in the second quarter, the Atlanta Hawks attempted 19 field goals and not a single free throw. Larry Drew's response to falling behind early was to play his worst possible defensive backcourt and the players' response was to double-down on jump shots. The Hawks used 20 of their 38 first half field goal attempts outside of 16 feet. Only seven of those were three-point attempts. Another four shots were taken between 12 and 14 feet.

The loss was comprehensive and, in every way, a team effort.

NBA Playbook: Round 1 Preview: Orlando vs. Atlanta

Today, my recently made friend* in real life, Sebatian Pruiti, put up the best and most thorough preview of the upcoming playoff series between the Atlanta Hawks and the Orlando Magic you will read.

This post may be up for awhile. Coverage of the final four games of the regular season will depend on the events therein. Breaking news--an injury, Pape Sy's NBA debut, Al Horford attempting a free throw--will be worthy of attention. Going through the motions will not.

*Sebastian at least tolerated me. Really, that's all I ask.

Larry Drew's Got This Figured Out

Michael Cunningham's latest blog post has an amazing quote from Larry Drew:

Drew turned on the television at 3 a.m. and came across a replay of the Thunder-Heat game from a couple weeks back:

"I am sitting there watching Kevin Durant and they are double-teaming him all over the place. But he goes quick. He gets his shot quick. He comes off the screens looking to shoot it quick. And he’s accepting double teams and making plays out of double teams. Sometimes it calls for showing a willingness to make the right plays out of double teams. If they see you are a reluctant passer the heat will be turned up even more. Not saying that’s what’s happening with us but those are the things you have to do with double teams. If you are a scorer, knowing that you are going to be double-teamed you have got to go into your shot and your offense a little quicker. If not, you have to make a play out of a double team. The other thing that affects double teams is where you are on the floor. It’s a lot easier to double team when you are on one side of the floor than when you are in the middle of the floor. We’ve gone to where doing more things out of middle of the floor."

Rest easy Hawks fans, the head coach has a plan: Joe Johnson should play like Kevin Durant.

This is the logical culmination of Drew's season-long imploring of Hawks players with a long history of not attacking the basket off the dribble to attack the basket off the dribble as if it was as easily done as said.

Of course, these pleas occur concurrent with allowing Josh Smith to take almost half his shots outside of 16 feet, running plays for Al Horford to curl around a down-screen to shoot a jumper, and a disinterest in using the three Hawks (Marvin Williams, Zaza Pachulia, and Jeff Teague) most likely to attack the basket and get to the free throw line.

Allow me to set those last three sentences from Drew apart for further contemplation:

"The other thing that affects double teams is where you are on the floor. It’s a lot easier to double team when you are on one side of the floor than when you are in the middle of the floor. We’ve gone to where doing more things out of middle of the floor."

To which every single person who has watched the Hawks play during the last four seasons responds, "Duh."

It's shocking that a man who was watched every single Hawks game over the past four seasons is having an epiphany right now about how much easier it is to defend a team when the ball stays on one side of the floor. It's doubly shocking that he would admit such in public.

NBA.com: Schuhmann: The Demise of the Hawks

John Schuhmann looks at the precipitous decline of the Atlanta Hawks offense from 2009-10 to 2010-11:

When Larry Drew took over for the fired Mike Woodson last summer, he promised to bring more ball movement to the Hawks’ offense. That sounded great to those that grew tired of Iso-Joe, but some wondered why Drew would mess with a good thing. The Hawks ranked third in the league offensively last season, scoring an efficient 108.9 points per 100 possessions. Iso-Joe may have looked ugly at times, and Atlanta may have ranked 16th in assist rate. But overall, Woodson’s offense worked for the Hawks.

Well, it looks now like Drew made a mistake. The Hawks rank 21st in the league offensively this season, scoring just 103.2 points per 100 possessions. They have Joe Johnson, Al Horford, Josh Smith and Jamal Crawford, and they’ve been worse offensively than the Pistons (103.9, 18th) and Raptors (103.5, 20th). They’re assisting on a higher percentage of their shots (ranking fourth in assist rate), but that doesn’t mean anything when they’re not getting as many shots at the basket.

These Things Are Real

Joe Johnson:

"[W]e are a jump-shooting team. If shots are falling then, great, we are rolling. But one through five, we all are jump shooters. That’s pretty much what it is."

As Josh Smith approaches taking half of his shots from outside of 16 feet, Al Horford adds the corner 3 and the step-back 18-footer to his arsenal, and Johnson is on pace for another career low Free Throw Rate this must surely be the apex of one-dimensional inefficiency if not also self-awareness, at least in Johnson's case.

ESPN's new director of analytics, Dean Oliver, in essay about the Miami Heat addresses two topics relevant to the sputtering Atlanta offense: over-dribbling and the absence of the -roll part of the pick-and-roll.

The Atlanta Hawks Defy the Percentages

NOTE: All shot location data cited comes from Hoopdata. League averages and rankings cited come from Basketball-Reference.com

Prelude

The Atlanta Hawks have an above average offense but they're below average at two of the four factors (offensive rebounding, free throw rate) and their turnover rate is almost exactly at the league average. Only when shooting the ball do the Hawks exceed an average team's performance. If you were going to pick just one of the four factors at which to excel, that would be the one but the Hawks are a good, rather than an exceptional field goal shooting team. They rank 11th in the league in eFG%, as many percentage points behind league-leader Boston as they are ahead of 26th and 27th ranked Washington and New Jersey.

The interesting stuff

The Hawks aren't an above average shooting team because they take or make a lot of three-point shots. The average NBA team takes 22.4% of their field goal attempts from beyond the arc. The Hawks take 23.1% of their field goal attempts from beyond the arc. The league averages 36% on three-point shots. The Hawks make 36.2% of their three-point shots. The Hawks pick up some ground on the league with their three-point shooting, but not a lot.

The Hawks aren't an above average shooting team because they take or convert a high percentage of shots at the rim. The average NBA team takes 27.2% of their field goal attempts at the rim and make 62.9% of those shots. The Hawks take 23.2% of their field goal attempts at the rim and make just 60.6% of those shots.

No, the Hawks are an above average shooting team because they make low-percentage shots far more often than an average team.

Here are a couple of graphs comparing the shot distribution of the league as a whole to the shot distribution of the Hawks:

Look at the size of that green piece of pie the Hawks make. Only the Wizards and the Heat use a larger percentage of their field goal attempts on 16-23' jump shots. However, only the Dallas Mavericks better Atlanta's 44.4% shooting from that range. The league, as a whole, shoots just 39.3% from that range.

One possible explanation for Atlanta's success: The Hawks earn assists on 69% of their made field goals from that range. The league as a whole earns an assist on just 61.2% of such shots. It's quite possible the Hawks create higher-quality long two-point jump shots than most teams.

Looking at the success of individual Atlanta players from that range this season lends some support to this hypothesis. Joe Johnson (36.4% from 16-23') and Mike Bibby (37.6% from 16-23') both create a lot of their own long, two-point jump shots with just 30.4% and 52.3%, respectively, coming off assists. Al Horford (57.7% from 16-23') earns a teammate an assist on 92% of his long two-point jump shots.

There's conflicting evidence, as well. Jamal Crawford has made 45.5% of his long two-point jump shots but just 36.9% of them are assisted.

Another way the Hawks thrive despite taking so many (generally speaking) low-percentage shots is by taking fewer of the next lowest-percentage shots. NBA teams typically use 25.5% of their field goal attempts on shots outside of the basket area but inside of 16 feet. The Hawks take just 24.4% of their shots from that vast mid-range. The Hawks best the league average field goal percentage from that range, as well, almost entirely on the strength of Joe Johnson and Al Horford combining to make 129 of 243 shots (53.1%) inside of 10 feet but not at the rim so far this season. The league shoots just 43.4% from that range.

Sustainability

Is the unusual nature of Atlanta's shooting success sustainable come the playoffs? The Hawks have played just 15 of their 44 games this season against teams with winning records and they've struggled horribly on the offensive end in those games, averaging less than a point per possession.

Given the small sample size and the across-the-board offensive declines the team has suffered against better opposition, it's difficult, if not unreasonable to proffer an answer with any certainty.

Based on what's happened, though, jump shooting has been the least of Atlanta's offensive problems against teams with winning records. The Hawks have shot slightly more frequently and slightly less accurately outside of 16 feet in those games, but the serious problem has been in converting shots inside of 15 feet:

Opp	eFG% (16+')	%FGA (16+')
all	48.8	52.4
over .500	47.2	54.2

Opp	eFG% (inside 15')	%FGA (inside 15')
all	52.7	47.6
over .500	47.1	45.8

Whether this is indicative of a larger inability to create high-percentage shots* or the nature of sub-dividing performance into smaller and smaller segments (especially considering said segment includes an historically poor performance) is a fair question. Additional evidence (the Hawks are scheduled to play 10 straight games against teams with winning records in February and March) should help us come to an understanding as to whether the Hawks are forging a distinct path of offensive success or have just discovered a way to leverage their strengths and limit exposure of their weaknesses against less talented and successful teams.

*Supporting this notion, Atlanta's below average free throw rate plummets from 22.2 (19th in the league) to 17.0 (would rank dead last, and is less than three-quarters of the league average) when they've played teams with winning records this season.

NBA Playbook: The Hawks Struggle Against Toronto's Zone

Sebastian Pruiti analyzes the video evidence of Atlanta's stagnant zone offense:

The reason why the Hawks’ struggled against the zone is because it seemed that they reverted to their ISO tendencies once they saw the zone. The ball really started to stick, and that is the worst possible thing that you can do against the zone.

...

The Atlanta Hawks did just about everything they could to look bad against the zone, making just about every mistake you can against it. Despite that, they were able to eek out a win with a Mike Bibby three. It was against man to man defense.

Sebastian also breaks down how the Hawks got Mike Bibby open for his game-winning three.