All three games played in Washington have left the impression that neither team played especially well and neither team played especially poorly. Lending credence to that impression of just watching an Eastern Conference playoff series happen before me, the Hawks twice took a 7-point lead in the first half at which point the Wizards went on 5-0 and 13-2 runs. After Washington took their biggest lead of the game (11 points) in the third quarter, the Hawks scored the next 11 points.
As in the first two games, the biggest issue for the Hawks is a lack of talent on the roster. A well-executed offensive possession that ends with, say, an open Kent Bazemore three-point attempt or Ersan Ilyasova having to finish at the rim on the move doesn't have the expected value that leads to road playoff wins. Not to pick on Bazemore and Ilyasova exclusively.
Tim Hardway, Jr. has no chance to guard Bradley Beal and John Wall and, except for a two-minute stretch in the third quarter wherein he scored 8 of his 15 points, can't make up for his defensive ineptitude* offensively at this level of competition. He played the entire fourth quarter, missed all five of his field goal attempts and grabbed a single rebound with nine seconds left.
*His defensive performance in this series should be used in schools to teach young people that playing defense is not simply a matter of trying hard. He's trying hard. He's a bad defender.
Dwight Howard looked downright spry in the first quarter, twice contesting a shot to force a miss then moving to grab the rebound. Dwight Howard looked immobile in the second half and had a negligible impact on the game. The Hawks outscored the Wizards in both of Mike Muscala's second half stints but, per usual, one gets the sense that where Muscala's defender stands when he's on the court makes a larger impact than anything Muscala actively does.
The Hawks simply lack the talent to put five good players on the floor at any time despite sustained excellence from Paul Millsap* and Dennis Schröder. That the Hawks can stay in a road playoff game despite making 29% of their three-pointers, committing more turnovers, and attempting fewer free throws is a testament** to the soundness of the offensive and defensive framework in which they operate.
*If I can be indulged in one slight criticism of Millsap, he should just ditch his half-hearted pump fakes from beyond the three-point line. The league gets that he doesn't want to shoot that shot so the pump fake turns into more of a pause, allowing the primary and secondary defenders time to get set which makes it more difficult for Millsap to create a good shot (or draw a foul) off the dribble.
**It might be a testament to the Wizards not being that good, too.
On the brink of elimination that soundness provides hope for this team's short-term survival as well as the challenge of building a more talented, balanced roster for the 2017-18 season and beyond.
Showing posts with label game recap. Show all posts
Showing posts with label game recap. Show all posts
Thursday, April 27, 2017
Tuesday, April 25, 2017
The Jose Calderon Game
Whether seen again or not, this weekend's version of the Atlanta Hawks, the one that shoots threes better and turns the ball over less often their opponents, provided pure basketball pleasure. Or at least pleasure as pure as possible over 2 games that featured 90 personal fouls and approximately 80 post-foul discussions between various combinations of referees, players, and coaches.
The Hawks paired typically stout defense with shot-making and ball protection. They got (Brandon Jennings 20-foot step-backs, excepted) what you want from surrendering mid-range opportunities. John Wall was 1-7 in Game 4 from between 14 and 21 feet. Markieff Morris was 3-7 (and only one 3PTA). Otto Porter, Jr. was 1-4. Kelly Oubre, Jr. and Bojan Bogdanovic both went 0-1. Bradley Beal was 3-5, but 6 points on 5 shots was less damaging than the 26 points he got on his other 18 FGAs.
Dwight Howard was excellent in Game 4, lending further credence to the idea that he and Thabo Sefolosha were redundant, but having one defensive-oriented role player on the floor is valuable. On the offensive end, Howard's presence complicates using Millsap as the screener in pick-and-rolls because of the extra defender Washington gets to leave in the paint. But, in the second quarter, Kent Bazemore showed, on consecutive possessions, it is still possible to get into the lane and drop off a lob for Howard to finish.
Given my pre-series focus on how the Hawks could connive to get Paul Millsap matched up against Jason Smith, it's a bit embarrassing to recognize that I overlooked the simplest path: get Markieff Morris in foul trouble and trust Scott Brooks to make a puzzling rotation decision in a playoff game. Going big against the Hawks isn't as big a risk as resting Wall and Beal simultaneously, but I don't see how it helps his team.
One of my main worries* going into Game 4 was who the Hawks' third scorer would be. Of course, the Hawks had scorers third through seventh contribute, including two I'd given up on: Kent Bazemore (truly excellent) and Tim Hardaway, Jr., who showed signs of offensive life early in the fourth quarter against Washington's second unit (hint hint, Bud).
*Worrying about what happens if Millsap or Schröder has a bad offensive game is at the forefront of my thoughts about the decisive three games ahead.
Then there was Jose Calderon. In the kind of performance that can have a massive impact on winning a short series, he did the things you can fairly expect of him in his 36th year: make 40% of his threes, keep Bazemore and Hardaway, Jr. from playing out of position as the backup point guard...that's about it, actually. He also did things nearly unfathomable even as you witnessed them: a key fourth quarter tip-in in transition, confound the Wizards' attempt to get easy points by running him off of screens or posting him up with bigger shooters, raise the specter of a Jose Calderon/Brandon Jennings fight in a playoff game in the Year Of Our Lord 2017, and retroactively justify sitting Dennis Schröder for the last 14:28 of the first half because he had three fouls...in a game Schröder finished with three fouls after scoring 18 points in 18:49 of second half playing time.
The Hawks paired typically stout defense with shot-making and ball protection. They got (Brandon Jennings 20-foot step-backs, excepted) what you want from surrendering mid-range opportunities. John Wall was 1-7 in Game 4 from between 14 and 21 feet. Markieff Morris was 3-7 (and only one 3PTA). Otto Porter, Jr. was 1-4. Kelly Oubre, Jr. and Bojan Bogdanovic both went 0-1. Bradley Beal was 3-5, but 6 points on 5 shots was less damaging than the 26 points he got on his other 18 FGAs.
Dwight Howard was excellent in Game 4, lending further credence to the idea that he and Thabo Sefolosha were redundant, but having one defensive-oriented role player on the floor is valuable. On the offensive end, Howard's presence complicates using Millsap as the screener in pick-and-rolls because of the extra defender Washington gets to leave in the paint. But, in the second quarter, Kent Bazemore showed, on consecutive possessions, it is still possible to get into the lane and drop off a lob for Howard to finish.
Given my pre-series focus on how the Hawks could connive to get Paul Millsap matched up against Jason Smith, it's a bit embarrassing to recognize that I overlooked the simplest path: get Markieff Morris in foul trouble and trust Scott Brooks to make a puzzling rotation decision in a playoff game. Going big against the Hawks isn't as big a risk as resting Wall and Beal simultaneously, but I don't see how it helps his team.
One of my main worries* going into Game 4 was who the Hawks' third scorer would be. Of course, the Hawks had scorers third through seventh contribute, including two I'd given up on: Kent Bazemore (truly excellent) and Tim Hardaway, Jr., who showed signs of offensive life early in the fourth quarter against Washington's second unit (hint hint, Bud).
*Worrying about what happens if Millsap or Schröder has a bad offensive game is at the forefront of my thoughts about the decisive three games ahead.
Then there was Jose Calderon. In the kind of performance that can have a massive impact on winning a short series, he did the things you can fairly expect of him in his 36th year: make 40% of his threes, keep Bazemore and Hardaway, Jr. from playing out of position as the backup point guard...that's about it, actually. He also did things nearly unfathomable even as you witnessed them: a key fourth quarter tip-in in transition, confound the Wizards' attempt to get easy points by running him off of screens or posting him up with bigger shooters, raise the specter of a Jose Calderon/Brandon Jennings fight in a playoff game in the Year Of Our Lord 2017, and retroactively justify sitting Dennis Schröder for the last 14:28 of the first half because he had three fouls...in a game Schröder finished with three fouls after scoring 18 points in 18:49 of second half playing time.
Sunday, April 23, 2017
What Does It Mean?
There's nothing better than making shots. Pair it with the Hawks typically stout defense and the result is an insurmountable 25-point lead less than 11 minutes into a playoff game. Is it a one-off event, just something that happened or something portentous?
The first quarter saw a second consecutive positive stint for Atlanta's starting lineup (they couldn't repeat the feat at the start of the third) which saw useful defensive activity from Dwight Howard despite his extremely limited offensive involvement (he didn't attempt a field goal or free throw from 2:55 left in the first quarter until 5:39 left in the fourth quarter) and the rare sight of good Atlanta three-point shooting. With Thabo Sefolosha out of the rotation, the Hawks need more quality defensive role player minutes from Howard than I suspected before the series started. It appears Budenholzer has gotten to a point where he's working to get those and willing to go small.
The Hawks made 5-9 threes in the first quarter but, by the end of the game, they stand 15-61 from deep in the series' other 11 quarters. I lean toward putting "making a high percentage of threes" in "just something that happened" column. However, the Hawks got a lot of high-percentage two-point shots in the first three quarters which should be more replicable, especially if the non-John Wall Wizards give another low-energy performance (just 6 offensive rebounds, only 11 forced turnovers, 28 more fouls). Taurean Prince offered a vital third scoring option, getting 14 points on 7 shots through three quarters, outplaying Otto Porter, Jr. almost as badly as Paul Millsap did Markieff Morris (in a less obviously psychically scarring manner).
Though Dennis Schröder is clearly the second-best point guard in this series, he's playing at the top of his ability to score 25 efficient points per game and earn 24 assists against just 6 turnovers. Schröder's defense is never going to be of "stop John Wall" quality, it might never be good, even, but it's a better workplace when he's giving visible effort on that end. Nor should Schröder's best self overshadow Paul Millsap's continued two-way excellence, which is unique across both rosters in this series so far.
A blessedly quick turnaround for Game 4 should offer more information as to where the series stands. I'm not entirely clear on whether, in Millsap's framework, a third successive win for the home team means the series is still 0-0 or not.
The first quarter saw a second consecutive positive stint for Atlanta's starting lineup (they couldn't repeat the feat at the start of the third) which saw useful defensive activity from Dwight Howard despite his extremely limited offensive involvement (he didn't attempt a field goal or free throw from 2:55 left in the first quarter until 5:39 left in the fourth quarter) and the rare sight of good Atlanta three-point shooting. With Thabo Sefolosha out of the rotation, the Hawks need more quality defensive role player minutes from Howard than I suspected before the series started. It appears Budenholzer has gotten to a point where he's working to get those and willing to go small.
The Hawks made 5-9 threes in the first quarter but, by the end of the game, they stand 15-61 from deep in the series' other 11 quarters. I lean toward putting "making a high percentage of threes" in "just something that happened" column. However, the Hawks got a lot of high-percentage two-point shots in the first three quarters which should be more replicable, especially if the non-John Wall Wizards give another low-energy performance (just 6 offensive rebounds, only 11 forced turnovers, 28 more fouls). Taurean Prince offered a vital third scoring option, getting 14 points on 7 shots through three quarters, outplaying Otto Porter, Jr. almost as badly as Paul Millsap did Markieff Morris (in a less obviously psychically scarring manner).
Though Dennis Schröder is clearly the second-best point guard in this series, he's playing at the top of his ability to score 25 efficient points per game and earn 24 assists against just 6 turnovers. Schröder's defense is never going to be of "stop John Wall" quality, it might never be good, even, but it's a better workplace when he's giving visible effort on that end. Nor should Schröder's best self overshadow Paul Millsap's continued two-way excellence, which is unique across both rosters in this series so far.
A blessedly quick turnaround for Game 4 should offer more information as to where the series stands. I'm not entirely clear on whether, in Millsap's framework, a third successive win for the home team means the series is still 0-0 or not.
Sunday, April 16, 2017
Washington 114 Atlanta 107: Game 1 Recap Bullets
- Dwight Howard got a lot of rebounds (14!) and the Hawks were not good with him on the floor (-21 in 29 minutes!).
- Which means they outscored the Wizards by 14 points in the 18:54 Howard didn't play.
- Mike Muscala is not a good NBA player in an absolute sense, but he's a functional one. Given the Hawks' dearth of talent, that's not nothing in this context.
- Also relevant in this context, the Wizards' bench is not good. There is no expectation five-out Hawks lineups could blow out the Wizards' starters to same degree we saw five-out lineups succeed against these units today.
- I think it's a fair expectation that the Wizards' starters can consistently house this Atlanta starting lineup.
- The Hawks' starting lineup: -14.8/100 possessions in 26:49 entering this game, was outscored by 13 points over 27 possessions in 12:01 of this game.
- Dennis Schröder and Tim Hardaway, Jr. cannot guard John Wall and Bradley Beal and aren't good enough offensive players to mitigate that inability. Especially Hardaway, Jr., who put in so ineffectual and awkward-looking a playoff performance in a Hawks uniform that you'd be forgiven for mistaking it as a tribute to the young Marvin Williams.
- Schröder's inability/unwillingness to stop the ball when John Wall has it in transition is breathtaking.
- The Hawks probably can't lose games where they get almost a third of their shots from beyond the arc (plus only 8 long twos) and attempt 39 free throws and win the series.
- Thabo Sefolosha is such a good role player (amidst a roster full of okay role players), one could argue the Hawks were missing their second-best player.
- Still, Bud's rotations were baffling.
- Malcolm Delaney's NBA career is over, huh?
- Markieff Morris would rather play the Hawks than VCU.
Saturday, November 19, 2016
Friday Night Playoff Preview
The fourth quarter in Charlotte on Friday night wasn't a portent of playoff doom, but I suspect we'll see something similar again in April. Not the spectacle* of Dwight Howard getting ejected, but the mostly empty offensive possessions the Hawks managed from 5:54 to 1:17 of fourth quarter.
*Howard wasn't playing especially well before the ejection, his frustration with Cody Zeller causing him to call for the ball in the post which, at best, wasted several seconds of half-court possessions. The Hornets could afford to over-defend Howard, fronting him in the post and sagging toward him from weakside because the only Hawk you absolutely can't help off of (someone tell the Bucks this) is Kyle Korver.
Mike Muscala missing everything on a wide-open corner 3, Kent Bazemore and Dennis Schröder losing the ball in the lane after working to beat the initial defender aren't examples of a flawed process, something that can (or needs to) be fixed. They're examples of useful players butting up against the limits of their abilities. Sometimes they will convert those opportunities but more often they simply won't be able.
Swarm Millsap, don't help off of Korver, and force the other Hawks on the floor to make plays will be the default defensive strategy against this team on every possession that matters. Dwight Howard's freedom to go after offensive rebounds offers something the Hawks have not previously had on the back-end of initial possessions that end in a missed shot, but he doesn't add much on the front-end* of them.
*The Schröder/Howard pick-and-roll may develop enough to change my mind, but right now, teams can throw one to one-and-a-half help defenders toward it safe in the knowledge that Schröder largely operates on a binary - shoot or throw a lob to Howard - decision tree.
Running out Malcolm Delaney, Tim Hardaway, Jr., Thabo Sefolosha, Mike Muscala, and either Paul Millsap or Dwight Howard to grind down opposing second units is a good thing, and a viable path to 50 regular season wins. An effective second unit will be less valuable in the playoffs, where the margins are narrower*, and the team's inability to put multiple multi-dimensional offensive players on the court simultaneously will strangle a fair number of crucial offensive possessions.
*Unless you draw a clearly inferior version of yourself, as the Hawks did in the first round last season.
*Howard wasn't playing especially well before the ejection, his frustration with Cody Zeller causing him to call for the ball in the post which, at best, wasted several seconds of half-court possessions. The Hornets could afford to over-defend Howard, fronting him in the post and sagging toward him from weakside because the only Hawk you absolutely can't help off of (someone tell the Bucks this) is Kyle Korver.
Mike Muscala missing everything on a wide-open corner 3, Kent Bazemore and Dennis Schröder losing the ball in the lane after working to beat the initial defender aren't examples of a flawed process, something that can (or needs to) be fixed. They're examples of useful players butting up against the limits of their abilities. Sometimes they will convert those opportunities but more often they simply won't be able.
Swarm Millsap, don't help off of Korver, and force the other Hawks on the floor to make plays will be the default defensive strategy against this team on every possession that matters. Dwight Howard's freedom to go after offensive rebounds offers something the Hawks have not previously had on the back-end of initial possessions that end in a missed shot, but he doesn't add much on the front-end* of them.
*The Schröder/Howard pick-and-roll may develop enough to change my mind, but right now, teams can throw one to one-and-a-half help defenders toward it safe in the knowledge that Schröder largely operates on a binary - shoot or throw a lob to Howard - decision tree.
Running out Malcolm Delaney, Tim Hardaway, Jr., Thabo Sefolosha, Mike Muscala, and either Paul Millsap or Dwight Howard to grind down opposing second units is a good thing, and a viable path to 50 regular season wins. An effective second unit will be less valuable in the playoffs, where the margins are narrower*, and the team's inability to put multiple multi-dimensional offensive players on the court simultaneously will strangle a fair number of crucial offensive possessions.
*Unless you draw a clearly inferior version of yourself, as the Hawks did in the first round last season.
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
DE-FENSE! DE-FENSE!
But first, three paragraphs largely about offense. I am not a complete crack-pot.
For the first 18 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a ridiculous eFG% of 20.5%. For the next 18 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a ridiculous eFG% of 84.2%. For the entirety of the meaningful 36 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a reasonable eFG% of 54.2%.
There are reasons beyond cold probability that the Hawks shot significantly better for one stretch of the game than another. The Celtics came out playing very good defense from the jump. Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko took Marcus Smart's lead, getting physical leverage against Paul Millsap and Al Horford in the post. Smart and Isaiah Thomas defended Kyle Korver as well as they have so far in the series. That the Hawks were not getting the typical looks that allowed them to shoot 51.6% over 82 games contributed to them shooting 20.5% for a quarter-and-a-half last night.
Similarly, it is not entirely coincidental that the Hawks started making shots with unsustainable frequency at roughly the same moment they started turning stops into transition opportunities. A below average offense looked significantly better when it didn't have to face a set defense as often.Analysis! Observation.
The most frustrating thing about watching the Hawks spend much of the last four playoff series missing a higher percentage of shots than they have over the last two regular seasons is, natch, watching the Hawks miss shots. The second most frustrating thing is the tendency to formulate a supernatural explanation for the misses.
It's not impossible that the Hawks have struggled to convert the chances they're pleased to have created in the playoffs due to a collective character or psychological defect, but I contend the defensive performance they put on, possession-by-possession while shooting 20.5%, at home, in front of an increasingly anxious and frustrated audience demonstrates tremendous discipline and commitment. Which conforms with my prejudice to dismiss the character/psychological explanation for missed shots. Funny how that works.
Variance is not confined to shot-making. Though they've been excellent overall, the Hawks have not been perfect defensively for all five games in this series. They looked shockingly unprepared in the first quarter of Game 3. The transition defense* fell apart in the second half of the third quarter of Game 4. Still, the Hawks are holding the Celtics to 95 points per 100 possessions in this series, by bettering their second-best defense in the regular season numbers in three of the four factors.
*The chief culprit in Game 4, Mike Scott, was excellent for the second time this series, in Game 5.
The Hawks entered the playoffs with a 2-3% chance of winning the title, a 7-8% chance of winning the East, because they allowed 5 fewer points per 100 possessions than the league this season. The Hawks entered the playoffs with a 2-3% chance of winning the title, a 7-8% chance of winning the East, because they scored 1.3 points fewer than the league per 100 possessions this season. Offensive struggles, especially comical offensive struggles, tend toward the obvious. That's but half the story.
For the first 18 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a ridiculous eFG% of 20.5%. For the next 18 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a ridiculous eFG% of 84.2%. For the entirety of the meaningful 36 minutes of the game, the Hawks had a reasonable eFG% of 54.2%.
There are reasons beyond cold probability that the Hawks shot significantly better for one stretch of the game than another. The Celtics came out playing very good defense from the jump. Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko took Marcus Smart's lead, getting physical leverage against Paul Millsap and Al Horford in the post. Smart and Isaiah Thomas defended Kyle Korver as well as they have so far in the series. That the Hawks were not getting the typical looks that allowed them to shoot 51.6% over 82 games contributed to them shooting 20.5% for a quarter-and-a-half last night.
Similarly, it is not entirely coincidental that the Hawks started making shots with unsustainable frequency at roughly the same moment they started turning stops into transition opportunities. A below average offense looked significantly better when it didn't have to face a set defense as often.
The most frustrating thing about watching the Hawks spend much of the last four playoff series missing a higher percentage of shots than they have over the last two regular seasons is, natch, watching the Hawks miss shots. The second most frustrating thing is the tendency to formulate a supernatural explanation for the misses.
It's not impossible that the Hawks have struggled to convert the chances they're pleased to have created in the playoffs due to a collective character or psychological defect, but I contend the defensive performance they put on, possession-by-possession while shooting 20.5%, at home, in front of an increasingly anxious and frustrated audience demonstrates tremendous discipline and commitment. Which conforms with my prejudice to dismiss the character/psychological explanation for missed shots. Funny how that works.
Variance is not confined to shot-making. Though they've been excellent overall, the Hawks have not been perfect defensively for all five games in this series. They looked shockingly unprepared in the first quarter of Game 3. The transition defense* fell apart in the second half of the third quarter of Game 4. Still, the Hawks are holding the Celtics to 95 points per 100 possessions in this series, by bettering their second-best defense in the regular season numbers in three of the four factors.
*The chief culprit in Game 4, Mike Scott, was excellent for the second time this series, in Game 5.
The Hawks entered the playoffs with a 2-3% chance of winning the title, a 7-8% chance of winning the East, because they allowed 5 fewer points per 100 possessions than the league this season. The Hawks entered the playoffs with a 2-3% chance of winning the title, a 7-8% chance of winning the East, because they scored 1.3 points fewer than the league per 100 possessions this season. Offensive struggles, especially comical offensive struggles, tend toward the obvious. That's but half the story.
Sunday, April 24, 2016
Chains, Weakest Links, Etc.
Paul Millsap was spectacular, the Hawks were playing their brand of top-drawer defense (excellent first shot defense, some occasional slippage when the opposition grabbed offensive rebounds), and they were in good shape to survive the dreaded joint indecisive performances from Jeff Teague and Dennis Schroder*.
*Upon whom it is now clearly established to be open season.
The Hawks were up 13 points with 6:33 left in the third quarter. Mike Scott entered the game and was a complete disaster defensively for the next 6:33. Marcus Smart's semi-transition layup at 5:33 was due to Scott panicking and forcing Kent Bazemore not to pick up Smart in transition. Scott could not stay in front of Smart on the downhill, natch. Jonas Jerebko's two threes - at 1:23 to cut Atlanta's lead to 8 and at 0:20 to cut Atlanta's lead to 3 - were both directly attributable to Scott losing all contact with Jerebko at the first opportunity.
Scott wouldn't play again, but it was game-on at that point, enough for the short-term variance of the Celtics making slop (Marcus Smart's two threes, Isaiah Thomas banking in a 15-footer he threw up at roughly 19-foot weight from the top of the key) while the Hawks missed high-percentage shots (Horford missed a jump hook on the block, a wide-open corner 3, plus wide-open, spot-up 15- and 19-footers, Korver missed both his threes) in the fourth quarter. Said variance then made meaningful Teague dribbling out the final 15 seconds of a tie game in regulation, and the Celtics thoroughly outplaying the Hawks in overtime.
For the glass-half full types, perhaps the Hawks combined the Teague/Schroder dual dud and the lack of quality depth potential losses into a single L. For those inclined toward pessimism, the Hawks just dropped a pair of winnable games against a shameless bunch to reduce their chances of winning the series to home-court advantage over a three-game sample size.
*Upon whom it is now clearly established to be open season.
The Hawks were up 13 points with 6:33 left in the third quarter. Mike Scott entered the game and was a complete disaster defensively for the next 6:33. Marcus Smart's semi-transition layup at 5:33 was due to Scott panicking and forcing Kent Bazemore not to pick up Smart in transition. Scott could not stay in front of Smart on the downhill, natch. Jonas Jerebko's two threes - at 1:23 to cut Atlanta's lead to 8 and at 0:20 to cut Atlanta's lead to 3 - were both directly attributable to Scott losing all contact with Jerebko at the first opportunity.
Scott wouldn't play again, but it was game-on at that point, enough for the short-term variance of the Celtics making slop (Marcus Smart's two threes, Isaiah Thomas banking in a 15-footer he threw up at roughly 19-foot weight from the top of the key) while the Hawks missed high-percentage shots (Horford missed a jump hook on the block, a wide-open corner 3, plus wide-open, spot-up 15- and 19-footers, Korver missed both his threes) in the fourth quarter. Said variance then made meaningful Teague dribbling out the final 15 seconds of a tie game in regulation, and the Celtics thoroughly outplaying the Hawks in overtime.
For the glass-half full types, perhaps the Hawks combined the Teague/Schroder dual dud and the lack of quality depth potential losses into a single L. For those inclined toward pessimism, the Hawks just dropped a pair of winnable games against a shameless bunch to reduce their chances of winning the series to home-court advantage over a three-game sample size.
Saturday, April 23, 2016
Atlanta's Missing 72 Hours
Game 2 was so broadly, quickly, and thoroughly discussed by professional basketball writers on Wednesday that I didn't bother tossing off a regurgitation of themes in this space. The consensus was that Brad Stevens had a couple of remaining options to mitigate the matchup problems caused by the opposition and his own team's poor health: replace Jared Sullinger to improve spacing and play Isaiah Thomas off the ball to get him opportunities to attack a defense in flux. So why did the Hawks look unprepared for these Boston adjustments defensively? What were they preparing to face for the last 72 hours?
In Game 3, the Celtics started Jonas Jerebko for Sullinger and forced Jeff Teague to chase Isaiah Thomas around the court while Evan Turner initiated offense. The Hawks appeared completely unprepared for the former, sagging toward the lane in their established manner then frantically trying to close down the extra four feet to Jerebko beyond the three-point line.
When you attack the ball, when you help and recover in sync as much as the Hawks do on defense, four feet is a meaningful distance. If you don't close those four feet? You're either giving up an open shot on the first pass or the next defensive rotation has more ground/less time to close out on the recipient of the next pass. In the first quarter, the Celtics moved the ball and the Hawks couldn't move farther and faster. The Celtics made five three-pointers (Jerebko, Turner, and Jae Crowder* each made their only three-pointer of the game in the first 9:12 of the game), 7 of 11 two-pointers, had a free throw rate of 38.1** and grabbed 25% of the (few) possible offensive rebounds.
*Crowder's three to put the Celtics up 29-14 was perhaps the greatest indictment of the Hawks' lack of defensive execution. Paul Millsap helped down to about 8 feet on a Jared Sullinger iso/post-up in the lane that Mike Muscala (about whom, more below) had under control. Millsap's attention encouraged Sullinger to think about the pass and it was an easy one to make. In short, Millsap gave up an open, spot-up three to a 32% career three-point shooter to double a career 39% shooter from 3-10 feet who struggles to score against length (we remember you, Jeff Withey).
**Season average free throw rate for Hawks opponents: 19.4. Boston's free throw rate in Games 1 and 2 combined: 14.2.
I think the Hawks can adjust to the personnel change. In the last three quarters of Game 3, the Celtics only made six threes, their free throw rate was down to 26.2 (though that would have been higher had the Celtics not missed 7 free throws), and they only grabbed 15% of 33 offensive rebound opportunities. On the other hand, the Celtics continued making two-point shots at a high rate (51.2%) over the final three quarters. There was more space in the lane (and more transition opportunities) than in the first two games. That's where Isaiah Thomas playing off the ball causes real concerns.
Jeff Teague has worked hard over the past three seasons to make himself a passable pick-and-roll defender (at least when he gets to work with Millsap or Al Horford). Chasing a faster player off the ball doesn't allow him to draw on any of those skills he's developed and reduces him to his lowly, natural defensive state. It's not a matter of effort. Teague is trying, but he's being asked to do something new and difficult at the part of basketball he's least good at, at the age of nearly 28.
So how do the Hawks counter? I suspect it will be by rotating their better off-the ball defenders: Kent Bazemore, Thabo Sefolosha, even Dennis Schroder (when the Hawks play him with Teague*). The hope would be that extra defensive length could trouble Thomas with late close-outs** and that Evan Turner could easily be tempted into taking a lot of mid-range, dribble-heavy isos when guarded by Teague. The Hawks should be willing for Evan Turner to attempt all the two-point shots he wants.
*The Teague/Schroder combo was +1 in 6:22 in Game 3. Nothing in that sentence is meaningful other than eliminating "That was awful. Never try that again." from Mike Budenholzer's rotation decision-making tree.
**They would have to be controlled closeouts, running guys off the three-point line, as the Hawks did so consistently well this season. Atypically, the Hawks repeatedly, wildly contested not-that-dangerous two-point jump shots in Game 3. Their defensive excellence is predicated on playing aggressively and not fouling. Take either element away and they quickly trend toward mere above-averageness defensively. Their offense can't make up for that consistently.
On the other end of the floor, the Hawks continued to create good looks and continued to struggle to convert them. Non-Korver Hawks made 4-27 three-point attempts (they would be expected to make ~9 of those over a long enough sample, or, Marcus Smart made as many three-pointers in 4 attempts as Bazemore, Teague, Millsap, Horford, and Schroder did in 20 attempts) and did the following from 5:45 to 3:06 of the game (from 98-101 to 100-104):
Process? I'm certain the Hawks think so. Sunday would be a nice time to show their work.
Notes on the benches:
In Game 3, the Celtics started Jonas Jerebko for Sullinger and forced Jeff Teague to chase Isaiah Thomas around the court while Evan Turner initiated offense. The Hawks appeared completely unprepared for the former, sagging toward the lane in their established manner then frantically trying to close down the extra four feet to Jerebko beyond the three-point line.
When you attack the ball, when you help and recover in sync as much as the Hawks do on defense, four feet is a meaningful distance. If you don't close those four feet? You're either giving up an open shot on the first pass or the next defensive rotation has more ground/less time to close out on the recipient of the next pass. In the first quarter, the Celtics moved the ball and the Hawks couldn't move farther and faster. The Celtics made five three-pointers (Jerebko, Turner, and Jae Crowder* each made their only three-pointer of the game in the first 9:12 of the game), 7 of 11 two-pointers, had a free throw rate of 38.1** and grabbed 25% of the (few) possible offensive rebounds.
*Crowder's three to put the Celtics up 29-14 was perhaps the greatest indictment of the Hawks' lack of defensive execution. Paul Millsap helped down to about 8 feet on a Jared Sullinger iso/post-up in the lane that Mike Muscala (about whom, more below) had under control. Millsap's attention encouraged Sullinger to think about the pass and it was an easy one to make. In short, Millsap gave up an open, spot-up three to a 32% career three-point shooter to double a career 39% shooter from 3-10 feet who struggles to score against length (we remember you, Jeff Withey).
**Season average free throw rate for Hawks opponents: 19.4. Boston's free throw rate in Games 1 and 2 combined: 14.2.
I think the Hawks can adjust to the personnel change. In the last three quarters of Game 3, the Celtics only made six threes, their free throw rate was down to 26.2 (though that would have been higher had the Celtics not missed 7 free throws), and they only grabbed 15% of 33 offensive rebound opportunities. On the other hand, the Celtics continued making two-point shots at a high rate (51.2%) over the final three quarters. There was more space in the lane (and more transition opportunities) than in the first two games. That's where Isaiah Thomas playing off the ball causes real concerns.
Jeff Teague has worked hard over the past three seasons to make himself a passable pick-and-roll defender (at least when he gets to work with Millsap or Al Horford). Chasing a faster player off the ball doesn't allow him to draw on any of those skills he's developed and reduces him to his lowly, natural defensive state. It's not a matter of effort. Teague is trying, but he's being asked to do something new and difficult at the part of basketball he's least good at, at the age of nearly 28.
So how do the Hawks counter? I suspect it will be by rotating their better off-the ball defenders: Kent Bazemore, Thabo Sefolosha, even Dennis Schroder (when the Hawks play him with Teague*). The hope would be that extra defensive length could trouble Thomas with late close-outs** and that Evan Turner could easily be tempted into taking a lot of mid-range, dribble-heavy isos when guarded by Teague. The Hawks should be willing for Evan Turner to attempt all the two-point shots he wants.
*The Teague/Schroder combo was +1 in 6:22 in Game 3. Nothing in that sentence is meaningful other than eliminating "That was awful. Never try that again." from Mike Budenholzer's rotation decision-making tree.
**They would have to be controlled closeouts, running guys off the three-point line, as the Hawks did so consistently well this season. Atypically, the Hawks repeatedly, wildly contested not-that-dangerous two-point jump shots in Game 3. Their defensive excellence is predicated on playing aggressively and not fouling. Take either element away and they quickly trend toward mere above-averageness defensively. Their offense can't make up for that consistently.
On the other end of the floor, the Hawks continued to create good looks and continued to struggle to convert them. Non-Korver Hawks made 4-27 three-point attempts (they would be expected to make ~9 of those over a long enough sample, or, Marcus Smart made as many three-pointers in 4 attempts as Bazemore, Teague, Millsap, Horford, and Schroder did in 20 attempts) and did the following from 5:45 to 3:06 of the game (from 98-101 to 100-104):
- 5:45 - Millsap missed dunk (contested by Isaiah Thomas!)
- 5:31 - Teague layup blocked by Evan Turner
- 4:56 - Teague missed runner/layup
- 4:22 - Horford misses six-footer on the block
- 3:49 - Bazemore made layup
- 3:06 - Horford transition layup blocked by Marcus Smart
Process? I'm certain the Hawks think so. Sunday would be a nice time to show their work.
Notes on the benches:
- Dennis Schroder has played very good basketball over the last two games. Mostly defensively in Game 2 and mostly offensively in Game 3. I don't know that the Celtics are on the right side of their risk/reward calculation re: hitting and baiting Schroder. Sure, you might wind him up enough to retaliate or make a few bad decisions with the ball in his hands in the short-term, but if he gets going you've got no one who can stay in front of him and all of a sudden Teague is the second-best point guard the Hawks have that night. Schroder may frustrate the Hawks, but they love him cooking more than you hate him chirping and a good Schroder game elevates whatever marginal teamwork value exists from an adrenalized boost of fraternal feelings about a common opponent.
- Marcus Smart's block on Horford in transition makes his flopping, sloppy execution (MARCUS SMART CANNOT CONCENTRATE LONG ENOUGH TO GUARD KYLE KORVER), and poor shot selection even more frustrating. It would be a shame if Smart never becomes more than a high-energy Josh Smith with a worse offensive game.
- Mike Scott continues to play fine-to-good basketball in this series, though committing a lane violation when Korver is at the line to complete a Crawford to tie the game is a maddening demerit.
- Mike Muscala continues to show why his consistency led to him falling out of the rotation again this season. He offers consistently strong defense and ineffective offense. His spacing and movement on offense is theoretically sound but consistently less productive than you want. He's not a Pero Antic-level defensive savant, so he needs to figure out how to get the ball in the basket without turning it over. (Career 57% TS% and 33% from three though, so maybe the inconsistent minutes are fooling my puny human brain.)
- It's a toss up on who provided emptier minutes between Tim Hardaway, Jr. and Kirk Hinrich. Which is less of a surprise than Budenholzer playing them a combined six minutes in a competitive game when the Hawks last played on Tuesday. If close, road playoff games don't warrant playing your handful of best players 36+ minutes, then what are we all doing here?
Sunday, April 17, 2016
Brad Stevens Has Matchup Problems
There are only so many out of bounds plays Brad Stevens will have the opportunity to call. The Celtics have to figure out a way to get stops because they have to get transition opportunities to score with any sort of efficiency. If anyone other than Isaiah Thomas is dribbling, they look like a college offense and even Thomas was, at times, reduced to throwing himself into the nearest defender and hoping for a referee to bail him out.
The Celtics were probably fortunate to give up only 102 points. You can maybe wave away the totality of sending the Hawks to the free throw line 35 times through references to late-game intentional fouling and referees with very inconsistent views on allowable contact, but the Celtics don't typically play defense without fouling. They have to be aggressive to force turnovers at their preferred rate. And I don't think you can sell any of the favored narratives used to pretend defenses have a significant influence on single-game three-point percentage. The Hawks 27 three-point attempts were generally taken by the players the Hawks want taking three-pointers, they weren't unduly contested, and they didn't overwhelmingly occur late in the shot clock.
I don't know what Stevens can do differently, given his personnel, to force the Hawks into lower-percentage field goal attempts. Even hoping the Hawks continue to miss shots is extra cold comfort when you've just let the Atlanta Hawks (the Atlanta Hawks!) grab 27% of their misses. That's an indictment of either your execution or your talent. Amir Johnson is, and always has been, a good player but Millsap and Horford are better than he is at everything he's good at. Stevens showed little interest in playing Kelly Olynyk significant minutes. Jonas Jerebko can only hope to out-Mike Scott Mike Scott*. Jared Sullinger? You can't expect a fat guy with a terrible haircut to accomplish anything substantial against Al Horford.
*Mike Scott played as well as you could hope, more than making up for Dennis Schroder's disappointingly passive play to give the Hawks a crucial seventh contributor. Scott also passed Schroder as the Hawk most likely to take a swing at Marcus Smart. Speaking of, I thought Smart, despite being +6 for the game, offers the greatest hope for improvement for the Celtics in Game 2 and beyond simply by not taking six three-pointers again and showing better assignment discipline when asked to guard Korver.
It's widely recognized going small helps the Celtics less against the Hawks than it does against most teams because the Hawks, since Tiago Splitter was lost for the season, already play 5 out all the time. Going small has less positive impact when Jae Crowder appears incapable of keeping Jeff Teague in front of him. Stevens can't even hide Isaiah Thomas on Kent Bazemore if Bazemore moves without the ball because Thomas will get caught ball-watching.
All the Celtics guards and wings (with the exception of the now, sadly absent, Avery Bradley) are drawn to the ball, leaving them susceptible to quick, constant, and sound ball and player movement. Which is understandable, given that I started this by talking about how they have to create transition opportunities to score consistently. Such is the stress of being a good team confronting a challenge directed squarely at what you believe makes you good.
To their credit, there's almost no chance that any doubt the Hawks create for the Celtics will adversely effect Boston's level of effort. Which forces the Hawks to apply relentless pressure to make the Celtics crack the only place they will, the only place that matters: the scoreboard.
The Celtics were probably fortunate to give up only 102 points. You can maybe wave away the totality of sending the Hawks to the free throw line 35 times through references to late-game intentional fouling and referees with very inconsistent views on allowable contact, but the Celtics don't typically play defense without fouling. They have to be aggressive to force turnovers at their preferred rate. And I don't think you can sell any of the favored narratives used to pretend defenses have a significant influence on single-game three-point percentage. The Hawks 27 three-point attempts were generally taken by the players the Hawks want taking three-pointers, they weren't unduly contested, and they didn't overwhelmingly occur late in the shot clock.
I don't know what Stevens can do differently, given his personnel, to force the Hawks into lower-percentage field goal attempts. Even hoping the Hawks continue to miss shots is extra cold comfort when you've just let the Atlanta Hawks (the Atlanta Hawks!) grab 27% of their misses. That's an indictment of either your execution or your talent. Amir Johnson is, and always has been, a good player but Millsap and Horford are better than he is at everything he's good at. Stevens showed little interest in playing Kelly Olynyk significant minutes. Jonas Jerebko can only hope to out-Mike Scott Mike Scott*. Jared Sullinger? You can't expect a fat guy with a terrible haircut to accomplish anything substantial against Al Horford.
*Mike Scott played as well as you could hope, more than making up for Dennis Schroder's disappointingly passive play to give the Hawks a crucial seventh contributor. Scott also passed Schroder as the Hawk most likely to take a swing at Marcus Smart. Speaking of, I thought Smart, despite being +6 for the game, offers the greatest hope for improvement for the Celtics in Game 2 and beyond simply by not taking six three-pointers again and showing better assignment discipline when asked to guard Korver.
It's widely recognized going small helps the Celtics less against the Hawks than it does against most teams because the Hawks, since Tiago Splitter was lost for the season, already play 5 out all the time. Going small has less positive impact when Jae Crowder appears incapable of keeping Jeff Teague in front of him. Stevens can't even hide Isaiah Thomas on Kent Bazemore if Bazemore moves without the ball because Thomas will get caught ball-watching.
All the Celtics guards and wings (with the exception of the now, sadly absent, Avery Bradley) are drawn to the ball, leaving them susceptible to quick, constant, and sound ball and player movement. Which is understandable, given that I started this by talking about how they have to create transition opportunities to score consistently. Such is the stress of being a good team confronting a challenge directed squarely at what you believe makes you good.
To their credit, there's almost no chance that any doubt the Hawks create for the Celtics will adversely effect Boston's level of effort. Which forces the Hawks to apply relentless pressure to make the Celtics crack the only place they will, the only place that matters: the scoreboard.
Friday, May 13, 2011
Chicago Bulls 93 Atlanta Hawks 73
Apologies to anyone who tried to read this recap or comment on a post during Blogger's 20+ hour downtime.
Boxscore
Gameflow
Hoopdata boxscore
Hawks fans can’t have anything nice.
The team’s streak of not winning more than one playoff series in a season since moving to Atlanta remains intact as does the desultory nature of their elimination from the playoffs. One has to go back to 1998* for an example of the Hawks losing their final playoff game by fewer than ten points. One has to go back to 1988 for an example of the Hawks scoring more than 92 points in their final playoff game. In each of the last three** seasons, the Hawks have been eliminated from the playoffs at home, scoring an average of 77 points and losing by an average of 14 and two-thirds points.
*Even then, the Hawks blew a six-point halftime lead as the Hornets hammered them to the tune of 56-41 in the second half.
**Go back four seasons, and you can include the 99-65 Game 7 loss in Boston. In the last Atlanta playoff appearance of the 1990s, the Hawks scored 66 points in New York. It’s basically pick-your-unappealing-end-point when it comes to Atlanta playoff exits.
It says something of the quality of the team’s regular season that watching the Hawks win 6 of their first 11 playoff games (while being outscored by 33 points) provided both pleasure and reasons for optimism. It says something of the experience of being a Hawks fan that a 20-point loss in the 12th playoff game could render both obsolete.
Jeff Teague, with his head coach finally given no choice but to play him, blossomed in this series, putting a performance that speaks volumes of his talent and provides an unexpected hope for the team’s improvement in 2011-12 (if applicable). Teague’s absence, first through coaching decision then through injury, for three-and-a-half quarters (Yes, Teague returned but he was not himself.) brought familiar flaws (roster construction, indifference to perimeter defense on the court and on the sideline) back to the surface.
Al Horford, on the day he earned well-deserved acclaim in the All-NBA voting, completed a dispiriting series wherein his friend and former teammate Joakim Noah’s defense clearly got the better of him. It’s no coincidence* that Horford’s two best games in the series came when the Hawks moved the ball and moved without the ball and he suffered when placed in isolation against one of the game’s premier defenders. The experience of watching Horford play out, in microcosm, Joe Johnson’s playoff career with the Hawks provides equal evidence of Horford’s status of the team’s best player* and the team’s dysfunction. Given the typical number of touches Horford receives in the post, one wonders if Larry Drew’s pre-game declaration, "A guy of his size and his ability, one area of improvement he really needs to make is his footwork," though true, is simply the Al Horford equivalent of needing to see more consistency from Jeff Teague.
*The Bulls used Noah (and Asik) against Horford throughout the series. For much of the second quarter of Game 6, Tom Thibodeau, defense obsessive, was perfectly fine with Kyle Korver guarding Joe Johnson. Horford may be the team’s best player by process of elimination (with Johnson’s defense and rebounding and Josh Smith’s shot selection being the respective eliminating factors) but he is the team’s best player.
Nor is it a coincidence that Carlos Boozer became an offensive force in this series once Jason Collins entered the starting lineup. The Hawks might not have made the second round without Collins but his one specific skill cannot be utilized in a variety of circumstances. Collins made the hobbled Boozer look athletic by comparison and could not have fairly been expected to close out on Boozer to 18 feet. Nor should Collins ever have been put in the position of being one of the baseline wing defenders in a 2-3 zone. If you have to close out on a shooter in the right corner with a defender from the left side of the floor (see Keith Bogans, 5:56 of the third quarter), you’ve got your tactics wrong.
Larry Drew never seemed to understand that Jamal Crawford was nearly as one-dimensional as Collins nor that Crawford’s great skill and his greatest liability overlapped so neatly with those of Joe Johnson. In Game 6, Drew’s hand was eventually forced by the injuries to Teague and Kirk Hinrich but his early, tactical decision to replace Teague with Crawford had the same result as it did in Game 5: Chicago extending their lead to double-digits in the first quarter.
Drew deserves credit both for the defensive gameplan against Orlando and his team’s offensive performances in Games 1 and 4 of the Chicago series. There is a very real chance that he learned on the job during his rookie season. On the other hand, in Game 6, his indiscriminate deployment of Collins and Crawford, his willingness not to play Jeff Teague, his decision to pull Al Horford from the game for the final 72 seconds of the first half* because he had committed two personal fouls, and the eight jump shots that Josh Smith attempted outside of 16 feet (5-37 in the series from that range) brought the criticisms Drew fairly received all season back to the fore.
*This didn’t change the outcome of the game but it was completely unnecessary as it was an elimination game, Horford finished the game with two fouls, and those all-important fourth quarter minutes Drew was presumably saving Horford for ended being played by Josh Powell and Hilton Armstrong anyway.
John Hollinger is optimistic about the Hawks’ future (though part of that comes from him being less convinced of Jeff Teague’s competence during the regular season than I) and, perhaps as the disappointment of another comprehensive defeat in the team’s last stand fades, I, too, will be able to focus on the possibility that a Teague/Hinrich backcourt can make a significant defensive difference, the possibility that Josh Smith overwhelmingly takes shots he’s likely to make, the possibility that Al Horford develops a post game good enough to draw a double-team and take full advantage of his passing skills, the possibility that Jamal Crawford is allowed to leave and all the possessions he uses go to more multi-faceted offensive players, the possibility that the Hawks receive anything of value in exchange for Marvin Williams (-33 in 108 minutes in the Chicago series), and the possibility that the Hawks find cheap, quality talent to fill out the bench. Some of those possibilities may come to pass when next we see professional basketball in Atlanta. Right now, they all feel very far away.
Boxscore
Gameflow
Hoopdata boxscore
Hawks fans can’t have anything nice.
The team’s streak of not winning more than one playoff series in a season since moving to Atlanta remains intact as does the desultory nature of their elimination from the playoffs. One has to go back to 1998* for an example of the Hawks losing their final playoff game by fewer than ten points. One has to go back to 1988 for an example of the Hawks scoring more than 92 points in their final playoff game. In each of the last three** seasons, the Hawks have been eliminated from the playoffs at home, scoring an average of 77 points and losing by an average of 14 and two-thirds points.
*Even then, the Hawks blew a six-point halftime lead as the Hornets hammered them to the tune of 56-41 in the second half.
**Go back four seasons, and you can include the 99-65 Game 7 loss in Boston. In the last Atlanta playoff appearance of the 1990s, the Hawks scored 66 points in New York. It’s basically pick-your-unappealing-end-point when it comes to Atlanta playoff exits.
It says something of the quality of the team’s regular season that watching the Hawks win 6 of their first 11 playoff games (while being outscored by 33 points) provided both pleasure and reasons for optimism. It says something of the experience of being a Hawks fan that a 20-point loss in the 12th playoff game could render both obsolete.
Jeff Teague, with his head coach finally given no choice but to play him, blossomed in this series, putting a performance that speaks volumes of his talent and provides an unexpected hope for the team’s improvement in 2011-12 (if applicable). Teague’s absence, first through coaching decision then through injury, for three-and-a-half quarters (Yes, Teague returned but he was not himself.) brought familiar flaws (roster construction, indifference to perimeter defense on the court and on the sideline) back to the surface.
Al Horford, on the day he earned well-deserved acclaim in the All-NBA voting, completed a dispiriting series wherein his friend and former teammate Joakim Noah’s defense clearly got the better of him. It’s no coincidence* that Horford’s two best games in the series came when the Hawks moved the ball and moved without the ball and he suffered when placed in isolation against one of the game’s premier defenders. The experience of watching Horford play out, in microcosm, Joe Johnson’s playoff career with the Hawks provides equal evidence of Horford’s status of the team’s best player* and the team’s dysfunction. Given the typical number of touches Horford receives in the post, one wonders if Larry Drew’s pre-game declaration, "A guy of his size and his ability, one area of improvement he really needs to make is his footwork," though true, is simply the Al Horford equivalent of needing to see more consistency from Jeff Teague.
*The Bulls used Noah (and Asik) against Horford throughout the series. For much of the second quarter of Game 6, Tom Thibodeau, defense obsessive, was perfectly fine with Kyle Korver guarding Joe Johnson. Horford may be the team’s best player by process of elimination (with Johnson’s defense and rebounding and Josh Smith’s shot selection being the respective eliminating factors) but he is the team’s best player.
Nor is it a coincidence that Carlos Boozer became an offensive force in this series once Jason Collins entered the starting lineup. The Hawks might not have made the second round without Collins but his one specific skill cannot be utilized in a variety of circumstances. Collins made the hobbled Boozer look athletic by comparison and could not have fairly been expected to close out on Boozer to 18 feet. Nor should Collins ever have been put in the position of being one of the baseline wing defenders in a 2-3 zone. If you have to close out on a shooter in the right corner with a defender from the left side of the floor (see Keith Bogans, 5:56 of the third quarter), you’ve got your tactics wrong.
Larry Drew never seemed to understand that Jamal Crawford was nearly as one-dimensional as Collins nor that Crawford’s great skill and his greatest liability overlapped so neatly with those of Joe Johnson. In Game 6, Drew’s hand was eventually forced by the injuries to Teague and Kirk Hinrich but his early, tactical decision to replace Teague with Crawford had the same result as it did in Game 5: Chicago extending their lead to double-digits in the first quarter.
Drew deserves credit both for the defensive gameplan against Orlando and his team’s offensive performances in Games 1 and 4 of the Chicago series. There is a very real chance that he learned on the job during his rookie season. On the other hand, in Game 6, his indiscriminate deployment of Collins and Crawford, his willingness not to play Jeff Teague, his decision to pull Al Horford from the game for the final 72 seconds of the first half* because he had committed two personal fouls, and the eight jump shots that Josh Smith attempted outside of 16 feet (5-37 in the series from that range) brought the criticisms Drew fairly received all season back to the fore.
*This didn’t change the outcome of the game but it was completely unnecessary as it was an elimination game, Horford finished the game with two fouls, and those all-important fourth quarter minutes Drew was presumably saving Horford for ended being played by Josh Powell and Hilton Armstrong anyway.
John Hollinger is optimistic about the Hawks’ future (though part of that comes from him being less convinced of Jeff Teague’s competence during the regular season than I) and, perhaps as the disappointment of another comprehensive defeat in the team’s last stand fades, I, too, will be able to focus on the possibility that a Teague/Hinrich backcourt can make a significant defensive difference, the possibility that Josh Smith overwhelmingly takes shots he’s likely to make, the possibility that Al Horford develops a post game good enough to draw a double-team and take full advantage of his passing skills, the possibility that Jamal Crawford is allowed to leave and all the possessions he uses go to more multi-faceted offensive players, the possibility that the Hawks receive anything of value in exchange for Marvin Williams (-33 in 108 minutes in the Chicago series), and the possibility that the Hawks find cheap, quality talent to fill out the bench. Some of those possibilities may come to pass when next we see professional basketball in Atlanta. Right now, they all feel very far away.
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Chicago Bulls 95 Atlanta Hawks 83
Boxscore
The problem with energy is that it's finite. The Atlanta Hawks fell behind early in Game 5, they fell behind by a lot: 15 points just 10:37 into the game. They worked hard to get all of that back before the third quarter ended but had nothing left in the tank to compete effectively in the fourth.
The Bulls played Taj Gibson and Omer Asik and Ronnie Brewer for the entirety of the competitive portion of the fourth quarter. In normal circumstances, they aren't collectively better than Jeff Teague and Josh Smith and Al Horford. When they're fresh (none of the Chicago trio had played more than 10 minutes in the game prior to the fourth quarter) and the Hawks players are exhausted, well, energy won out.
It's not a knock on Teague or Smith or Horford or Joe Johnson that they ran out of gas three-quarters of the way through the 93rd game of the season. They gave all they had. Nor is Larry Drew in line for criticism for riding his starters too hard. Only Zaza Pachulia provided any productive auxiliary minutes. Jason Collins didn't hurt the team when he was on the floor but he didn't help, either.
The same can't be said of Jamal Crawford. If anything, Drew played Crawford too much. That early 15-point deficit came about, in no small part, because Crawford allowed Keith Bogans to score roughly a week's worth of points (that would be a total of 8 points) on three consecutive possessions. Crawford provides no value if he's not making shots and he missed eight of his nine shots tonight, generally showing a greater interest in flopping post-release than even pretending to play defense.
Some joker on Chicago's stat crew inserted nine minutes, two points, and a rebound on Marvin Williams' line of the box score. I watched the game. I know better.
Even if Drew doesn't deserve criticism for the lack of options at his disposal tonight, a Hawks fan couldn't help, even while savoring the possibility of the Hawks winning the game, but watch Jeff Teague score 21 points on 11 shots, earn 7 assists, refrain from committing a turnover, and make Derrick Rose work for many of his 33 points, and feel angry about many, if not most, of 1674 minutes he watched Mike Bibby play for the Hawks this season. Some of the pleasure of this (modest-to-date) playoff run derives from the element of surprise. In no way, though, would a second-round playoff exit or a trip to the Conference finals be undermined had Teague (and, to a lesser extent, Pachulia) played as much during the regular season as his talent (especially relative to the alternatives) clearly warranted.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ATL | 79 | 1.051 | 48.6 | 19.7 | 22.9 | 12.7 | |
| CHI | 80 | 1.188 | 51.4 | 29.2 | 28.6 | 13.8 |
The problem with energy is that it's finite. The Atlanta Hawks fell behind early in Game 5, they fell behind by a lot: 15 points just 10:37 into the game. They worked hard to get all of that back before the third quarter ended but had nothing left in the tank to compete effectively in the fourth.
The Bulls played Taj Gibson and Omer Asik and Ronnie Brewer for the entirety of the competitive portion of the fourth quarter. In normal circumstances, they aren't collectively better than Jeff Teague and Josh Smith and Al Horford. When they're fresh (none of the Chicago trio had played more than 10 minutes in the game prior to the fourth quarter) and the Hawks players are exhausted, well, energy won out.
It's not a knock on Teague or Smith or Horford or Joe Johnson that they ran out of gas three-quarters of the way through the 93rd game of the season. They gave all they had. Nor is Larry Drew in line for criticism for riding his starters too hard. Only Zaza Pachulia provided any productive auxiliary minutes. Jason Collins didn't hurt the team when he was on the floor but he didn't help, either.
The same can't be said of Jamal Crawford. If anything, Drew played Crawford too much. That early 15-point deficit came about, in no small part, because Crawford allowed Keith Bogans to score roughly a week's worth of points (that would be a total of 8 points) on three consecutive possessions. Crawford provides no value if he's not making shots and he missed eight of his nine shots tonight, generally showing a greater interest in flopping post-release than even pretending to play defense.
Some joker on Chicago's stat crew inserted nine minutes, two points, and a rebound on Marvin Williams' line of the box score. I watched the game. I know better.
Even if Drew doesn't deserve criticism for the lack of options at his disposal tonight, a Hawks fan couldn't help, even while savoring the possibility of the Hawks winning the game, but watch Jeff Teague score 21 points on 11 shots, earn 7 assists, refrain from committing a turnover, and make Derrick Rose work for many of his 33 points, and feel angry about many, if not most, of 1674 minutes he watched Mike Bibby play for the Hawks this season. Some of the pleasure of this (modest-to-date) playoff run derives from the element of surprise. In no way, though, would a second-round playoff exit or a trip to the Conference finals be undermined had Teague (and, to a lesser extent, Pachulia) played as much during the regular season as his talent (especially relative to the alternatives) clearly warranted.
Sunday, May 08, 2011
Atlanta Hawks 100 Chicago Bulls 88
Boxscore
I don't think it's a coincidence that, when the Atlanta Hawks scored on seven of eight offensive possessions between the 4:46 and 1:00 mark of the fourth quarter to transform a tie game into one they led by 11 points, Joe Johnson and Jamal Crawford never, save for the one scoreless possession, touched the ball inside the three-point line. Unlike Johnson and Crawford, Jeff Teague and Josh Smith and Al Horford each possess the skill and athleticism to attack the basket while simultaneously presenting the possibility of passing the ball to an open teammate should the opportunity arise. Johnson can accomplish the latter and Crawford the former but neither presents an unpredictable element to opposing defenses. Of course, Teague and Smith and Horford benefited from the attention Johnson* and Crawford drew from Chicago defenders who expected them to receive, hold, and shoot the ball so perhaps all those stagnant fourth quarters where the Hawks stubbornly struggled to score finally paid off with tonight's 33 point explosion.
*And the Hawks surely aren't tied without Johnson making 8 of 11 shots through the first three quarters, even though he gave back a few of those buckets at the defensive end.
The experience of Games 2 and 3 should caution any Hawks fan from expecting the Hawks to follow up with more of the successful same but not to enjoy performances as enjoyable as those in Games 1 and 4 would be foolish. It's because none among us know when the next good Hawks performance will appear or, at times, we wonder if the next good Hawks performance will appear that this competitive Conference Semifinal series seems a treat.
Which isn't to say that the Hawks played a perfect game. Josh Smith took six more jump shots. He made his first, and celebrated the fact, before missing the next five. Tellingly, none of the attempts came in the fourth quarter. The Hawks still look fifty-fifty at best to convert any given transition opportunity. Jamal Crawford remains an exploitable defender even for a mediocre offensive team having a difficult (Chicago's 25 point, 20 possession first quarter excluded) night. Carlos Boozer took advantage of extended minutes from Jason Collins and Zaza Pachulia to contribute offensively for the first time since Game 1. The Bulls grabbed 29.3% of their possible offensive rebounds. Still, as in Game 1, the consistent, purposeful effort with which the team played superseded their flaws.
No Hawk exemplified that better than Smith. Despite the five (the sixth, excusably, came as the shot clock expired) possessions wasted with jumpers, Smith outplayed everyone else on the floor. Not just through his 23 points, 16 rebounds, and 8 assists but also with his defensive work on Luol Deng at the start of either half. If Deng had gotten the quality of look he's generally enjoyed when guarded by Marvin Williams in this series, Atlanta's imperfections might have been more damaging.
If Game 3 showed all that Derrick Rose could be, Game 4 showed all that the Bulls, at less than their best, can force him into having to be. With neither Deng nor Kyle Korver providing a third offensive option, Rose had to take on an even greater load than he did in his 27 shot, 9 free throw, 7 assist, 2 turnover performance in the previous game. Rose took 32 shots, 11 free throws, earned 10 assists, and committed 3 turnovers tonight. He earned every one of his 34 points and the degree to which the Hawks (most of the time) made him earn those points only confirms how exceptional his shot-making was in Game 3.
If the Hawks play together, if they move and move the ball, if they defend as a team, then Derrick Rose alone is not enough to beat them. If the Bulls can isolate the Hawks from each other offensively, if the Bulls can exploit the attention the Hawks must give Rose, then they will, obviously, control the game. Both scenarios have played out twice this series. Whichever we see twice more will decide the outcome.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| CHI | 87 | 1.011 | 42.9 | 26.9 | 29.3 | 13.8 | |
| ATL | 88 | 1.136 | 51.9 | 19.8 | 21.9 | 14.8 |
I don't think it's a coincidence that, when the Atlanta Hawks scored on seven of eight offensive possessions between the 4:46 and 1:00 mark of the fourth quarter to transform a tie game into one they led by 11 points, Joe Johnson and Jamal Crawford never, save for the one scoreless possession, touched the ball inside the three-point line. Unlike Johnson and Crawford, Jeff Teague and Josh Smith and Al Horford each possess the skill and athleticism to attack the basket while simultaneously presenting the possibility of passing the ball to an open teammate should the opportunity arise. Johnson can accomplish the latter and Crawford the former but neither presents an unpredictable element to opposing defenses. Of course, Teague and Smith and Horford benefited from the attention Johnson* and Crawford drew from Chicago defenders who expected them to receive, hold, and shoot the ball so perhaps all those stagnant fourth quarters where the Hawks stubbornly struggled to score finally paid off with tonight's 33 point explosion.
*And the Hawks surely aren't tied without Johnson making 8 of 11 shots through the first three quarters, even though he gave back a few of those buckets at the defensive end.
The experience of Games 2 and 3 should caution any Hawks fan from expecting the Hawks to follow up with more of the successful same but not to enjoy performances as enjoyable as those in Games 1 and 4 would be foolish. It's because none among us know when the next good Hawks performance will appear or, at times, we wonder if the next good Hawks performance will appear that this competitive Conference Semifinal series seems a treat.
Which isn't to say that the Hawks played a perfect game. Josh Smith took six more jump shots. He made his first, and celebrated the fact, before missing the next five. Tellingly, none of the attempts came in the fourth quarter. The Hawks still look fifty-fifty at best to convert any given transition opportunity. Jamal Crawford remains an exploitable defender even for a mediocre offensive team having a difficult (Chicago's 25 point, 20 possession first quarter excluded) night. Carlos Boozer took advantage of extended minutes from Jason Collins and Zaza Pachulia to contribute offensively for the first time since Game 1. The Bulls grabbed 29.3% of their possible offensive rebounds. Still, as in Game 1, the consistent, purposeful effort with which the team played superseded their flaws.
No Hawk exemplified that better than Smith. Despite the five (the sixth, excusably, came as the shot clock expired) possessions wasted with jumpers, Smith outplayed everyone else on the floor. Not just through his 23 points, 16 rebounds, and 8 assists but also with his defensive work on Luol Deng at the start of either half. If Deng had gotten the quality of look he's generally enjoyed when guarded by Marvin Williams in this series, Atlanta's imperfections might have been more damaging.
If Game 3 showed all that Derrick Rose could be, Game 4 showed all that the Bulls, at less than their best, can force him into having to be. With neither Deng nor Kyle Korver providing a third offensive option, Rose had to take on an even greater load than he did in his 27 shot, 9 free throw, 7 assist, 2 turnover performance in the previous game. Rose took 32 shots, 11 free throws, earned 10 assists, and committed 3 turnovers tonight. He earned every one of his 34 points and the degree to which the Hawks (most of the time) made him earn those points only confirms how exceptional his shot-making was in Game 3.
If the Hawks play together, if they move and move the ball, if they defend as a team, then Derrick Rose alone is not enough to beat them. If the Bulls can isolate the Hawks from each other offensively, if the Bulls can exploit the attention the Hawks must give Rose, then they will, obviously, control the game. Both scenarios have played out twice this series. Whichever we see twice more will decide the outcome.
Wednesday, May 04, 2011
Chicago Bulls 86 Atlanta Hawks 73
Boxscore
The Hawks won Game 1 on the strength of their energy, their execution, and their shot-making. In Game 2, energy was all they offered with any consistency. Joe Johnson and Marvin Williams both failed to convert transition opportunities early. Jamal Crawford took the first possible (as opposed to the first plausible) shot most of the night. Outside of the three buckets at the basket Al Horford or Jeff Teague created for him in the second half and a putback of one of those Crawford misses, Josh Smith didn't (nor did he deserve to, 0-6 on jump shots) make a field goal. Horford earned six assists but, in no small part due to Joakim Noah's active defense, couldn't buy a bucket for himself. Only Teague (21 points on 14 shots, 3 assists, 0 turnovers) provided a link to the extraordinary Game 1 offensive performance.
The offensive struggles wasted a winnable defensive performance. Teague again did as good a job on Derrick Rose as could reasonably be expected before switching over to chase Kyle Korver around in the fourth quarter. The Hawks could make the change because Rose remained content (or capable only) to shoot pull-up jumpers when Jamal Crawford sagged six-to-eight feet off of him.
It was more a case of Rose not taking advantage of the matchup than Crawford putting in an unexpectedly good defensive performance. He replaced Teague with 5:20 left in the first quarter and the game tied. When Teague re-entered the game 8 minutes and 21 seconds later, the Hawks were down six and the Chicago lead would be permanent.
That the Hawks defended Chicago so effectively despite an execrable defensive performance from Josh Smith only underlines the wasted opportunity. Though Smith blocked Carlos Boozer's shots for fun, he grabbed just three defensive rebounds in 35:41 and quite possibly failed to block out a single Bull the entire night. Al Horford battling alone in the paint for a defensive rebound against two or more Chicago Bulls was a common sight as Noah, Boozer, and Taj Gibson each grabbed at least three offensive rebounds.
In a half-court game where both teams struggled to make shots, rebounding gained outsized importance. For the Bulls, rebounding was a team effort. It's true that the Hawks, especially with Marvin Williams and Zaza Pachulia on the bench for most of the night, lack talented rebounders and that the Bulls are always going to be likely to win that battle. That likelihood is no excuse for Josh Smith displaying a greater interest in complaining about the mistakes and shortcomings which defined his performance tonight than in rebounding Chicago's frequent missed shots.
The Hawks return to Atlanta with homecourt advantage but without the full margin for error Chicago's 42.3 eFG% and 14 turnovers tonight could have provided them.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ATL | 85 | 0.859 | 35.7 | 23.4 | 18.5 | 14.1 | |
| CHI | 85 | 1.012 | 42.3 | 17.9 | 32.6 | 16.5 |
The Hawks won Game 1 on the strength of their energy, their execution, and their shot-making. In Game 2, energy was all they offered with any consistency. Joe Johnson and Marvin Williams both failed to convert transition opportunities early. Jamal Crawford took the first possible (as opposed to the first plausible) shot most of the night. Outside of the three buckets at the basket Al Horford or Jeff Teague created for him in the second half and a putback of one of those Crawford misses, Josh Smith didn't (nor did he deserve to, 0-6 on jump shots) make a field goal. Horford earned six assists but, in no small part due to Joakim Noah's active defense, couldn't buy a bucket for himself. Only Teague (21 points on 14 shots, 3 assists, 0 turnovers) provided a link to the extraordinary Game 1 offensive performance.
The offensive struggles wasted a winnable defensive performance. Teague again did as good a job on Derrick Rose as could reasonably be expected before switching over to chase Kyle Korver around in the fourth quarter. The Hawks could make the change because Rose remained content (or capable only) to shoot pull-up jumpers when Jamal Crawford sagged six-to-eight feet off of him.
It was more a case of Rose not taking advantage of the matchup than Crawford putting in an unexpectedly good defensive performance. He replaced Teague with 5:20 left in the first quarter and the game tied. When Teague re-entered the game 8 minutes and 21 seconds later, the Hawks were down six and the Chicago lead would be permanent.
That the Hawks defended Chicago so effectively despite an execrable defensive performance from Josh Smith only underlines the wasted opportunity. Though Smith blocked Carlos Boozer's shots for fun, he grabbed just three defensive rebounds in 35:41 and quite possibly failed to block out a single Bull the entire night. Al Horford battling alone in the paint for a defensive rebound against two or more Chicago Bulls was a common sight as Noah, Boozer, and Taj Gibson each grabbed at least three offensive rebounds.
In a half-court game where both teams struggled to make shots, rebounding gained outsized importance. For the Bulls, rebounding was a team effort. It's true that the Hawks, especially with Marvin Williams and Zaza Pachulia on the bench for most of the night, lack talented rebounders and that the Bulls are always going to be likely to win that battle. That likelihood is no excuse for Josh Smith displaying a greater interest in complaining about the mistakes and shortcomings which defined his performance tonight than in rebounding Chicago's frequent missed shots.
The Hawks return to Atlanta with homecourt advantage but without the full margin for error Chicago's 42.3 eFG% and 14 turnovers tonight could have provided them.
Monday, May 02, 2011
Atlanta Hawks 103 Chicago Bulls 95
Boxscore
With the exception of a brief period early in the third quarter when the Chicago Bulls successfully isolated Joe Johnson on one side of the floor and Josh Smith took (and missed) three jump shots in three-and-a-half minutes, the Atlanta Hawks played a brand and quality of basketball that resembled what Larry Drew described this summer far more than that which they displayed during the bulk of the regular season. Had the Hawks, with any regularity, run motion offense at the pace and with the precision they demonstrated tonight against the league's best defense even the most pessimistic of observers wouldn't have predicted a series sweep.
The gold standard of Joe Johnson playoff performances has long been Game 4 of the Celtics series. Tonight's performance might have been better. Johnson's shot-making again drove his star performance but, just as impressively, he allowed the offensive system and his teammates to create easier scoring opportunities for him. The greatest frustration with Johnson has never been a lack of ability so much as his (and his coaches') stubborn insistence on making things difficult for himself. Not that the 84.2 TS% Johnson posted tonight represents a true talent level for a less dribble-heavy, less isolated Johnson but the foundation of some easy shots and a couple trips to the foul line transforms the more difficult shots Johnson can make at the end of otherwise unproductive possessions into daggers.
Now, the Hawks, even excepting Johnson, did make a lot of jump shots tonight as Jamal Crawford continued to score frequently and efficiently this playoff season. Jason Collins knocked down a couplejumpers set shots (and grabbed two offensive rebounds). Josh Smith made a contested baseline jumper to put the Hawks back up 10 with 3:42 left in the game. Many of these were shots Chicago wanted the Hawks to take. The Hawks may have to continue to make them to continue to win games in this series but it's the rest of the team's performance that convinces one that making or missing jump shots will determine the results of games rather than Chicago's margin of victory.
Given his lack of regular playing time over the past two seasons, Jeff Teague should probably be graded on a curve. But he needn't be. The 44:37 he played, the 10 points he scored on 11 shots (that 8 of those 11 came inside of 15 feet certainly contributed to the diverse offensive attack), the 5 assists he earned against a single turnover and the 27 shots Derrick Rose needed to score 24 points (even though the Bulls, as a whole, scored just as efficiently tonight against the Hawks as they did during the regular season) should earn the second-year point guard a passing grade on merit.
Johnson and Crawford's scoring success rendered Al Horford offensively peripheral in terms of shot attempts but his three offensive rebounds, four assists, and no turnovers complemented their efforts. At the other end of the floor, Horford's ten defensive rebounds were crucial as was his defense of the rim. Josh Smith ably assisted Horford on the latter count, blocking four shots as well as playing a key role in the consistent ball and player movement in the halfcourt offense in the first half and, when Smith appeared to have lost the plot in the second half, Zaza Pachulia played seven very solid minutes in relief, making a couple layups and grabbing five rebounds.
It was a team effort. An effort in service of a sound gameplan. Larry Drew should be proud on both counts. Though I suspect he'll be even happier with the energy the Hawks displayed. Energy that had early, tangible value. The Hawks didn't build their game-opening 9-0 lead through flawless execution. Two of their first four scoring possessions were sloppy and would have resulted in turnovers rather than points had the Hawks not been quicker than the Bulls to loose balls.
Energy, execution, shot-making. The streak is over. The Hawks lead the Bulls 1-0.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ATL | 87 | 1.184 | 55.8 | 20.5 | 25 | 11.5 | |
| CHI | 86 | 1.105 | 49.4 | 15.7 | 25.6 | 12.8 |
With the exception of a brief period early in the third quarter when the Chicago Bulls successfully isolated Joe Johnson on one side of the floor and Josh Smith took (and missed) three jump shots in three-and-a-half minutes, the Atlanta Hawks played a brand and quality of basketball that resembled what Larry Drew described this summer far more than that which they displayed during the bulk of the regular season. Had the Hawks, with any regularity, run motion offense at the pace and with the precision they demonstrated tonight against the league's best defense even the most pessimistic of observers wouldn't have predicted a series sweep.
The gold standard of Joe Johnson playoff performances has long been Game 4 of the Celtics series. Tonight's performance might have been better. Johnson's shot-making again drove his star performance but, just as impressively, he allowed the offensive system and his teammates to create easier scoring opportunities for him. The greatest frustration with Johnson has never been a lack of ability so much as his (and his coaches') stubborn insistence on making things difficult for himself. Not that the 84.2 TS% Johnson posted tonight represents a true talent level for a less dribble-heavy, less isolated Johnson but the foundation of some easy shots and a couple trips to the foul line transforms the more difficult shots Johnson can make at the end of otherwise unproductive possessions into daggers.
Now, the Hawks, even excepting Johnson, did make a lot of jump shots tonight as Jamal Crawford continued to score frequently and efficiently this playoff season. Jason Collins knocked down a couple
Given his lack of regular playing time over the past two seasons, Jeff Teague should probably be graded on a curve. But he needn't be. The 44:37 he played, the 10 points he scored on 11 shots (that 8 of those 11 came inside of 15 feet certainly contributed to the diverse offensive attack), the 5 assists he earned against a single turnover and the 27 shots Derrick Rose needed to score 24 points (even though the Bulls, as a whole, scored just as efficiently tonight against the Hawks as they did during the regular season) should earn the second-year point guard a passing grade on merit.
Johnson and Crawford's scoring success rendered Al Horford offensively peripheral in terms of shot attempts but his three offensive rebounds, four assists, and no turnovers complemented their efforts. At the other end of the floor, Horford's ten defensive rebounds were crucial as was his defense of the rim. Josh Smith ably assisted Horford on the latter count, blocking four shots as well as playing a key role in the consistent ball and player movement in the halfcourt offense in the first half and, when Smith appeared to have lost the plot in the second half, Zaza Pachulia played seven very solid minutes in relief, making a couple layups and grabbing five rebounds.
It was a team effort. An effort in service of a sound gameplan. Larry Drew should be proud on both counts. Though I suspect he'll be even happier with the energy the Hawks displayed. Energy that had early, tangible value. The Hawks didn't build their game-opening 9-0 lead through flawless execution. Two of their first four scoring possessions were sloppy and would have resulted in turnovers rather than points had the Hawks not been quicker than the Bulls to loose balls.
Energy, execution, shot-making. The streak is over. The Hawks lead the Bulls 1-0.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Atlanta Hawks 84 Orlando Magic 81
Boxscore
The Atlanta Hawks took control of this game in the first quarter on the strength of the defense played by Jason Collins and Kirk Hinrich. Without the play of those two without the ball in their hands, Jamal Crawford and Marvin Williams don't get a chance to make the jump shots that clinched the game for the Hawks (to the extent that Orlando missing open jump shots didn't clinch the game for the Hawks). Hinrich didn't just stifle Jameer Nelson when given the chance to play. He, in the first quarter, dug down very effectively on Howard (as Collins used his bulk to hold him up) and salvaged points from more than one sluggard and potentially empty Atlanta possession.
Of course, both Hinrich and Collins picked up a second personal foul in the first half, and thus sat for 9:14 and 9:45 of the second quarter, respectively. Collins played just 5:32 of the second half. Hinrich, before leaving the game due to injury, played just 10:14 of the second half. You can see how important it was neither picked up a third foul in the first half.
Hinrich left the game, following a bucket he made to give him 11 points on just 7 shots (plus 3 steals), with just 2:56 left in the fourth quarter. By my count, Orlando scored just 34 or their 84 points in the 20:58 Hinrich played and just 28 of their 84 points in the 16:41 Collins played.
The Hawks never trailed in the game. They were tied twice: 2-2 and 12-12. And still Larry Drew resisted the opportunity to put the players most likely to keep Orlando from scoring in the game. He got away with it, not because the alternatives played such good offense--Marvin Williams scored 10 points on 6 shots, Jamal Crawford scored 19 on 16 shots and 4 free throw attempts, Joe Johnson scored 23 points on 25 shots, and Josh Smith scored 8 points on 14 shots--but because the Magic, Dwight Howard once again excepted, could not quite score efficiently enough when Hinrich and Collins were off the court to take advantage of their absence.
Dwight Howard scored 25 points on 14 field goal and 12 free throw attempts. He committed six turnovers. Half of those before Larry Drew removed Collins and Hinrich from the game at the three minute mark of the first quarter. The rest of the Magic scored 56 points on 53 field goal and 10 free throw attempts while committing 8 turnovers. Orlando had open shots. On the perimeter when guarded by Crawford or Johnson or Josh Smith. Coming off curls to shoot or going to the basket when guarded by Crawford or Johnson. They didn't make many of them.
To Larry Drew's credit, he came up with an effective game plan to defend the Magic over 10 matchups this season. That's a huge step forward from the 2010 playoffs even if he didn't always stick with said plan. It turns out that a fixation on Dwight Howard had real, tangible value for the 2010-11 Atlanta Hawks.
With a willingness to be wrong twice in quick succession, I don't see how that fixation aids the Hawks against the Chicago Bulls, especially if Kirk Hinrich's knee injury is nearly as bad as it looked. There is no bullish Bull for Jason Collins to defend and there is no Atlanta guard* who can reasonably be expected to stay in front of Derrick Rose.
*Hinrich mostly stayed in front of Rose in the blowout loss in Atlanta on March 22nd but did so by giving Rose open jumpers which Rose knocked down at an unsustainably high rate. Even Hinrich would be looking to slow, rather than stop, Rose.
Plus, the Hawks scored 98.8, 89.4, and 94.2 points per 100 possessions in three meetings against the league's finest defensive team. Without a specialist to drag Chicago's (admittedly average offense) down to their level, with Chicago's best player positioned to exploit Atlanta's greatest defensive weakness, and Al Horford having suffered an additional injury since he led the Hawks to their lone victory on the strength of their two lone competitive quarters against the Bulls it's difficult to envision Atlanta competing in their next playoff series.
Winning a game against the Bulls would be some sort of mark of progress. But a mark of progress for a team that has lost 15 straight second round playoff games, was outscored during the regular season, and was outscored during their first-round series victory.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ORL | 84 | 0.964 | 47 | 26.9 | 22.6 | 16.7 | |
| ATL | 84 | 1.000 | 44.3 | 17.7 | 36.8 | 19 |
The Atlanta Hawks took control of this game in the first quarter on the strength of the defense played by Jason Collins and Kirk Hinrich. Without the play of those two without the ball in their hands, Jamal Crawford and Marvin Williams don't get a chance to make the jump shots that clinched the game for the Hawks (to the extent that Orlando missing open jump shots didn't clinch the game for the Hawks). Hinrich didn't just stifle Jameer Nelson when given the chance to play. He, in the first quarter, dug down very effectively on Howard (as Collins used his bulk to hold him up) and salvaged points from more than one sluggard and potentially empty Atlanta possession.
Of course, both Hinrich and Collins picked up a second personal foul in the first half, and thus sat for 9:14 and 9:45 of the second quarter, respectively. Collins played just 5:32 of the second half. Hinrich, before leaving the game due to injury, played just 10:14 of the second half. You can see how important it was neither picked up a third foul in the first half.
Hinrich left the game, following a bucket he made to give him 11 points on just 7 shots (plus 3 steals), with just 2:56 left in the fourth quarter. By my count, Orlando scored just 34 or their 84 points in the 20:58 Hinrich played and just 28 of their 84 points in the 16:41 Collins played.
The Hawks never trailed in the game. They were tied twice: 2-2 and 12-12. And still Larry Drew resisted the opportunity to put the players most likely to keep Orlando from scoring in the game. He got away with it, not because the alternatives played such good offense--Marvin Williams scored 10 points on 6 shots, Jamal Crawford scored 19 on 16 shots and 4 free throw attempts, Joe Johnson scored 23 points on 25 shots, and Josh Smith scored 8 points on 14 shots--but because the Magic, Dwight Howard once again excepted, could not quite score efficiently enough when Hinrich and Collins were off the court to take advantage of their absence.
Dwight Howard scored 25 points on 14 field goal and 12 free throw attempts. He committed six turnovers. Half of those before Larry Drew removed Collins and Hinrich from the game at the three minute mark of the first quarter. The rest of the Magic scored 56 points on 53 field goal and 10 free throw attempts while committing 8 turnovers. Orlando had open shots. On the perimeter when guarded by Crawford or Johnson or Josh Smith. Coming off curls to shoot or going to the basket when guarded by Crawford or Johnson. They didn't make many of them.
To Larry Drew's credit, he came up with an effective game plan to defend the Magic over 10 matchups this season. That's a huge step forward from the 2010 playoffs even if he didn't always stick with said plan. It turns out that a fixation on Dwight Howard had real, tangible value for the 2010-11 Atlanta Hawks.
With a willingness to be wrong twice in quick succession, I don't see how that fixation aids the Hawks against the Chicago Bulls, especially if Kirk Hinrich's knee injury is nearly as bad as it looked. There is no bullish Bull for Jason Collins to defend and there is no Atlanta guard* who can reasonably be expected to stay in front of Derrick Rose.
*Hinrich mostly stayed in front of Rose in the blowout loss in Atlanta on March 22nd but did so by giving Rose open jumpers which Rose knocked down at an unsustainably high rate. Even Hinrich would be looking to slow, rather than stop, Rose.
Plus, the Hawks scored 98.8, 89.4, and 94.2 points per 100 possessions in three meetings against the league's finest defensive team. Without a specialist to drag Chicago's (admittedly average offense) down to their level, with Chicago's best player positioned to exploit Atlanta's greatest defensive weakness, and Al Horford having suffered an additional injury since he led the Hawks to their lone victory on the strength of their two lone competitive quarters against the Bulls it's difficult to envision Atlanta competing in their next playoff series.
Winning a game against the Bulls would be some sort of mark of progress. But a mark of progress for a team that has lost 15 straight second round playoff games, was outscored during the regular season, and was outscored during their first-round series victory.
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Orlando Magic 101 Atlanta Hawks 76
Boxscore
It's just one game and some history still awaits the Hawks if they can win at home on Thursday or even in Orlando on Saturday but the chance to record an, if not outright impressive, at least a feel-good series victory likely passed them by tonight. The Hawks took bad shots, their head coach created foul trouble where none yet existed, that choice put an inferior defensive unit on the floor for long stretches of the first half, the Hawks fell way behind, and they tried to catch up by taking more bad shots. A familiar tale for the 2010-11 Hawks.
The Magic also made jump shots tonight and thus didn't need the extraordinary offensive production Dwight Howard had provided through four games. Which isn't to say that Howard wasn't a factor offensively. True, Orlando took control of the game with Howard on the bench after he committed two early fouls and Larry Drew kept Kirk Hinrich on the bench after committing two fouls in the first half as the Hawks fell irreparably behind, saving his best defensive guard for meaningful minutes that rapidly ceased to exist but the Magic were able to neutralize, for the most part, at least within the confines of this uncompetitive game, Hinrich's defense when he was on the court by repeatedly making him partner with the immobile Jason Collins to defend the pick-and-roll.
By running their 1/5 pick-and-roll to the middle of the floor when Collins was in the game, Orlando largely negated Atlanta's heretofore effective pick-and-roll defensive strategy. By attacking the lane, Orlando forced help to come a long way from the corner which both exacerbated Collins' limited mobility and forced the Hawks to rotate to, rather than sit on, shooters on the three-point line.
Yes, a good portion of the margin of victory is due to Orlando shooting well rather than horribly. And, yes, some of the rest of that margin can be attributed to Atlanta's hideous offensive display. But Orlando made a tactical adjustment. One that worked. As one who feared, before the series began, that the Hawks had but one way* to beat the Magic, the necessity of Larry Drew making a counter-adjustment proves fertile soil, at least in the immediate aftermath of this game, in which to sow the seeds of doubt.
*The Hawks beat the Magic in Game 1 by outscoring them but the last four games make that appear even more of a one-off than it seemed at the time.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ATL | 90 | 0.844 | 39.1 | 31.9 | 15.9 | 14.4 | |
| ORL | 89 | 1.135 | 47.6 | 26.5 | 23.4 | 6.7 |
It's just one game and some history still awaits the Hawks if they can win at home on Thursday or even in Orlando on Saturday but the chance to record an, if not outright impressive, at least a feel-good series victory likely passed them by tonight. The Hawks took bad shots, their head coach created foul trouble where none yet existed, that choice put an inferior defensive unit on the floor for long stretches of the first half, the Hawks fell way behind, and they tried to catch up by taking more bad shots. A familiar tale for the 2010-11 Hawks.
The Magic also made jump shots tonight and thus didn't need the extraordinary offensive production Dwight Howard had provided through four games. Which isn't to say that Howard wasn't a factor offensively. True, Orlando took control of the game with Howard on the bench after he committed two early fouls and Larry Drew kept Kirk Hinrich on the bench after committing two fouls in the first half as the Hawks fell irreparably behind, saving his best defensive guard for meaningful minutes that rapidly ceased to exist but the Magic were able to neutralize, for the most part, at least within the confines of this uncompetitive game, Hinrich's defense when he was on the court by repeatedly making him partner with the immobile Jason Collins to defend the pick-and-roll.
By running their 1/5 pick-and-roll to the middle of the floor when Collins was in the game, Orlando largely negated Atlanta's heretofore effective pick-and-roll defensive strategy. By attacking the lane, Orlando forced help to come a long way from the corner which both exacerbated Collins' limited mobility and forced the Hawks to rotate to, rather than sit on, shooters on the three-point line.
Yes, a good portion of the margin of victory is due to Orlando shooting well rather than horribly. And, yes, some of the rest of that margin can be attributed to Atlanta's hideous offensive display. But Orlando made a tactical adjustment. One that worked. As one who feared, before the series began, that the Hawks had but one way* to beat the Magic, the necessity of Larry Drew making a counter-adjustment proves fertile soil, at least in the immediate aftermath of this game, in which to sow the seeds of doubt.
*The Hawks beat the Magic in Game 1 by outscoring them but the last four games make that appear even more of a one-off than it seemed at the time.
Monday, April 25, 2011
Atlanta Hawks 88 Orlando Magic 85
Boxscore
Either prolonged exposure to this series is creating an illusion of coherence or Game 4 was the most Hawks/Magic game of this Hawks/Magic series. There were the requisite 88 points scored by the winning team, the terrible shot selection (both teams), the terrible shot-making (Orlando only), the improbably great yet perfectly representative, in kind if not frequency, shot-making of Jamal Crawford, a routine 29 and 17 from Dwight Howard, Jason Collins fouling, 19 unproductive minutes from hideously unqualified Hawk frontcourt reserves, the Hawks building a significant lead despite not playing very good offense, the Magic erasing that lead despite not playing very good offense, and the Hawks prevailing through some combination of the aforementioned Crawford and Collins plus an inefficient but impressive Al Horford, Joe Johnson being efficient but unimpressive for long stretches, Kirk Hinrich making Hawks fans so happy Mike Bibby's gone, and Josh Smith being inexplicable but not completely useless.
Oh, and Gilbert Arenas scored 20 points on 18 shots in 22 minutes.
Years from now, when looking back on this series, I contend we may remember this game* for that last fact. The possessions where Dwight Howard scored (or turned the ball over slightly too often) against single coverage, where Jamal Crawford compressed an entire contract year performance into a single series, where the Magic went from shooting a statistically improbably low percentage from the perimeter to an almost physically impossibly low percentage from the perimeter, those will begin, those may have begun, to run together in this oddly competitive playoff series that has featured few (successful) adjustments.
Then again, perhaps I just can't make complete sense of a series that has played out almost exactly inversely to my expectations.
*Game 1 will be the game the Hawks got to the free throw line, Game 2 will be the game Larry Drew...well, we'll have to come up for a name for whatever that was he did, and Game 3 will either be the game Zaza Pachulia sort of headbutted Jason Richardson once or the game Jamal Crawford banked in the game-winning three. All of this pending Game 5 and (if necessary) Games 6 and 7.
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ORL | 90 | 0.944 | 40.5 | 26.6 | 21.3 | 14.4 | |
| ATL | 91 | 0.967 | 50.7 | 16 | 17.9 | 17.6 |
Either prolonged exposure to this series is creating an illusion of coherence or Game 4 was the most Hawks/Magic game of this Hawks/Magic series. There were the requisite 88 points scored by the winning team, the terrible shot selection (both teams), the terrible shot-making (Orlando only), the improbably great yet perfectly representative, in kind if not frequency, shot-making of Jamal Crawford, a routine 29 and 17 from Dwight Howard, Jason Collins fouling, 19 unproductive minutes from hideously unqualified Hawk frontcourt reserves, the Hawks building a significant lead despite not playing very good offense, the Magic erasing that lead despite not playing very good offense, and the Hawks prevailing through some combination of the aforementioned Crawford and Collins plus an inefficient but impressive Al Horford, Joe Johnson being efficient but unimpressive for long stretches, Kirk Hinrich making Hawks fans so happy Mike Bibby's gone, and Josh Smith being inexplicable but not completely useless.
Oh, and Gilbert Arenas scored 20 points on 18 shots in 22 minutes.
Years from now, when looking back on this series, I contend we may remember this game* for that last fact. The possessions where Dwight Howard scored (or turned the ball over slightly too often) against single coverage, where Jamal Crawford compressed an entire contract year performance into a single series, where the Magic went from shooting a statistically improbably low percentage from the perimeter to an almost physically impossibly low percentage from the perimeter, those will begin, those may have begun, to run together in this oddly competitive playoff series that has featured few (successful) adjustments.
Then again, perhaps I just can't make complete sense of a series that has played out almost exactly inversely to my expectations.
*Game 1 will be the game the Hawks got to the free throw line, Game 2 will be the game Larry Drew...well, we'll have to come up for a name for whatever that was he did, and Game 3 will either be the game Zaza Pachulia sort of headbutted Jason Richardson once or the game Jamal Crawford banked in the game-winning three. All of this pending Game 5 and (if necessary) Games 6 and 7.
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Atlanta Hawks 103 Orlando Magic 93
Boxscore
Gameflow
Hoopdata boxscore
Highlights
A tremendous win for the Atlanta Hawks. Yes, that degree of jump shooting accuracy is unlikely to be sustainable for another game but neither can Dwight Howard (for an entire game) nor Jameer Nelson (for another half) be expected to be so simultaneously tremendous again for the Magic, especially if Larry Drew can resist the temptation to ask Josh Powell and Etan Thomas to defend Howard for a 12-minute stretch of the first half or leave Kirk Hinrich on the bench* for a ten-and-a-half minute stretch of the second half so Nelson can enjoy the freedom** of being guarded by Jamal Crawford.
*Safely, sadly assuming that playing Jeff Teague is not an option.
**Nelson scored 15 of his 23 second-half points in the five-and-a-half minutes Hinrich wasn't on the floor against him.
What makes this win tremendous is the location (The Hawks won six games all season on the road against teams with winning records, just two of those wins coming after December 7, 2010.) and the manner. The Hawks beat the Magic with offense, which suggests that I was wrong in my pre-series assessment that the Hawks had but one way in which to beat Orlando.
Nobody ever said the Atlanta Hawks looked bad when they make jump shots and, when the other shoe dropped* in the fourth quarter, the Orlando Magic remained a discombobulated two-man gang** unable to bridge the 14-point gap the Hawks created through three quarters.
*The Hawks made 1-9 shots outside of 16 feet in the fourth quarter which makes the 18 points they scored, by going 5-10 inside of 15 feet and getting to the line eight times, something of an accomplishment.
**Dwight Howard and Jameer Nelson scored 41 of Orlando's 45 second half points and it's not like they did so by using every offensive possession. Their teammates were 2-14 from the floor and committed four turnovers in the second half.
Let's bring back a chart for the series preview to examine where the Hawks scored Saturday night. The first two rows show the season averages for Atlanta and for Orlando's opponents. The third row shows Atlanta's totals from Game 1:
That's far from ideal shot distribution but the volume and quality of shots the Hawks took inside of 15 feet (plus the 29 free throws the Hawks, the Hawks!, attempted in the game) provides some encouragement the offense won't wither and die when they stop making more than half their shots outside of 16 feet. Though I suspect there will be more quarters in the remainder of the series where the Hawks score in the teens than in the thirties.
Also encouraging were two things written too rarely in this space this season: Josh Smith's shot selection and Joe Johnson's aggressive offensive play. Smith used just 2 of his 12 field goal attempts on shots in between the paint and the three-point line and made seven trips to the free throw line. Johnson took 9 of his 16 shots inside of 15 feet, got to the line 8 times himself, and used his ability to make long, difficult shots more often to bail out the Hawks on difficult offensive possessions than as the basis for difficult offensive possessions.
Gameflow
Hoopdata boxscore
Highlights
| Team | Poss | Off Eff | eFG% | FT Rate | OR% | TO% | |
| ATL | 89 | 1.157 | 55.4 | 28.4 | 15.6 | 11.2 | |
| ORL | 88 | 1.057 | 49.3 | 25.3 | 35.1 | 20.5 |
A tremendous win for the Atlanta Hawks. Yes, that degree of jump shooting accuracy is unlikely to be sustainable for another game but neither can Dwight Howard (for an entire game) nor Jameer Nelson (for another half) be expected to be so simultaneously tremendous again for the Magic, especially if Larry Drew can resist the temptation to ask Josh Powell and Etan Thomas to defend Howard for a 12-minute stretch of the first half or leave Kirk Hinrich on the bench* for a ten-and-a-half minute stretch of the second half so Nelson can enjoy the freedom** of being guarded by Jamal Crawford.
*Safely, sadly assuming that playing Jeff Teague is not an option.
**Nelson scored 15 of his 23 second-half points in the five-and-a-half minutes Hinrich wasn't on the floor against him.
What makes this win tremendous is the location (The Hawks won six games all season on the road against teams with winning records, just two of those wins coming after December 7, 2010.) and the manner. The Hawks beat the Magic with offense, which suggests that I was wrong in my pre-series assessment that the Hawks had but one way in which to beat Orlando.
Nobody ever said the Atlanta Hawks looked bad when they make jump shots and, when the other shoe dropped* in the fourth quarter, the Orlando Magic remained a discombobulated two-man gang** unable to bridge the 14-point gap the Hawks created through three quarters.
*The Hawks made 1-9 shots outside of 16 feet in the fourth quarter which makes the 18 points they scored, by going 5-10 inside of 15 feet and getting to the line eight times, something of an accomplishment.
**Dwight Howard and Jameer Nelson scored 41 of Orlando's 45 second half points and it's not like they did so by using every offensive possession. Their teammates were 2-14 from the floor and committed four turnovers in the second half.
Let's bring back a chart for the series preview to examine where the Hawks scored Saturday night. The first two rows show the season averages for Atlanta and for Orlando's opponents. The third row shows Atlanta's totals from Game 1:
| Team | at rim | 3-15 feet | 16-23 feet | 3PTA | ||||
| %FGA | eFG% | %FGA | eFG% | %FGA | eFG% | %FGA | eFG% | |
| ATL | 25.5 | 63.6 | 22.1 | 41.3 | 30.1 | 43.3 | 22.2 | 52.8 |
| ORL (opp) | 24.8 | 63 | 24.1 | 39 | 28.6 | 37.7 | 22.5 | 52.4 |
| Game 1 | 18.9 | 57.2 | 25.7 | 57.9 | 36.5 | 48.2 | 18.9 | 64.3 |
That's far from ideal shot distribution but the volume and quality of shots the Hawks took inside of 15 feet (plus the 29 free throws the Hawks, the Hawks!, attempted in the game) provides some encouragement the offense won't wither and die when they stop making more than half their shots outside of 16 feet. Though I suspect there will be more quarters in the remainder of the series where the Hawks score in the teens than in the thirties.
Also encouraging were two things written too rarely in this space this season: Josh Smith's shot selection and Joe Johnson's aggressive offensive play. Smith used just 2 of his 12 field goal attempts on shots in between the paint and the three-point line and made seven trips to the free throw line. Johnson took 9 of his 16 shots inside of 15 feet, got to the line 8 times himself, and used his ability to make long, difficult shots more often to bail out the Hawks on difficult offensive possessions than as the basis for difficult offensive possessions.
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